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INTRODUCTION
On their face, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
"Rules"), and state provisions modeled on them,1 present a
complex and seemingly contradictory approach to the pleading
of claims in multi-party litigation. At times claims are compul-
sory while at other times they are permissive. 2 At times claims
must have some relationship to the lawsuit as it has developed,
while in other instances this relationship is not required.3 Hid-
1. See generally Oakley & Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1378-
1424 (1986) (surveying the influence of the Federal Rules on the procedural
systems in state courts).
2. A pleader must raise compulsory claims or the pleader waives them
and cannot assert them over objection in a subsequent proceeding. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974). A pleader may
raise permissive claims at its option. If the pleader decides not to raise a per-
missive claim in the initial proceeding, the claim still may be raised in a subse-
quent action. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim) with
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b) (permissive counterclaim) and FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (per-
missive cross-claim) and FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (permissive impleader and re-
lated claims) and FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (permissive claim joinder).
3. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (requiring relationship with lawsuit for
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den shifts in status alter a party's rights and responsibilities re-
garding the claims the party can or must allege.4 Courts allow
some claims although the Rules appear to make no provision
for them.5 Taken as a whole, the multi-claim provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure present a flawed framework
for handling multi-claim litigation. At a minimum, the provi-
sions need to be amended to clarify their requirements. More
broadly, the time may be ripe for reconsidering the Rules as a
whole.
Part I of this Article illustrates the complexity of the Fed-
eral Rules governing multi-party practice, and shows how the
status of a party affects that party's ability to plead claims un-
related to the principal cause of action. Part II examines Fed-
eral Rules 13, 14, and 18, probing the ambiguous language of
these rules, along with relevant court decisions, to determine
the allowable claims each party to a case may bring. Part III
describes how the Rules balance the policy objectives of party
autonomy over the litigation and the concern for efficient use
of judicial resources. Part IV argues that the ambiguities in the
Rules can be resolved through amendment, and proposes sev-
eral amendments that would clearly articulate the allowable
claims for each party. The Article concludes that, beyond clari-
fying the Rules, the policy choices reflected in the Rules should
be reconsidered, particularly in light of the variety of ap-
proaches currently in use by the states.
I. AN OUTLINE OF THE RULES GOVERNING MULTI-
CLAIM LITIGATION
Those Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that govern multi-
claim litigation can be illustrated with a hypothetical involving
construction litigation. 6 Assume that A is a major builder of of-
compulsory counterclaim) and FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (requiring some relation-
ship with lawsuit for cross-claim) and FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (requiring some rela-
tionship with lawsuit for impleader and claims between original plaintiff and
third-party defendant) with FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b) (requiring no relationship
with lawsuit for permissive counterclaim) and FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (allowing
permissive joinder of claims unrelated to those previously pleaded in the
lawsuit).
4. See infra Parts II. A., II. B. 1., III. E. 1., IV. A. 1.
5. See infra Parts II. B. 2., III. E. 2., IV. A. 2.
6. In any number of long-term, on-going business arrangements, the
same parties often are involved in numerous separate transactions. This seems
particularly true in the construction industry. Given the relationships in-
volved, multi-claim litigation involving a number of separate incidents is not
unlikely. See generally Currie, Stephenson & Beck, The Owner Contemplat-
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fice buildings. In its dealings it often hires the same general
contractor (B), who in turn hires the same subcontractors (one
of whom is C), who deal with the same suppliers (one of whom
is D). As is common in this type of enterprise, the parties have
a certain amount of friction in their dealings, but usually re-
solve their differences informally. Upon a major falling out
over a particular project, however, A decides to sue.
The Rules give A as plaintiff a great deal of freedom in
structuring the lawsuit. Assuming A has potential rights to re-
lief against each of the other participants arising out of their
work on the building project, A can choose to sue one or more
of them.7 Assuming the parties are properly before the court,8
the Rules allow A as plaintiff to assert any claim it has against
any defendant, regardless of the relationship of the claims to
each other, but the Rules do not require A to do so.9
Assume A as owner of the building sues B, the general con-
tractor, and C, the subcontractor, for negligence and breach
of contract.10 A is considered an opposing party to B and
ing Litigation and Its Alternatives: An Overview, in CONSTRUCTION LITIGA-
TION: REPRESENTING THE OWNER § 1.3, at 5 (1984) (stating that "[t]he
construction process generates an inordinate number of disputes and lawsuits
.... [It] is inherent in the process."); Phillips, Making the Complex Simple in
CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES § 1.3, at 7 (1989)
(commenting that construction litigation almost always involves multiple
claims among multiple parties).
7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). This rule allows, but does not require, join-
der of defendants when at least one of the claims common to the defendants
arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or oc-
currences and the claims have an issue of law or fact in common. Id.
8. For purposes of the hypothetical, assume that the court has subject
matter jurisdiction over all the claims, territorial jurisdiction over all the par-
ties, and is a place of appropriate venue. These concerns often significantly
limit the otherwise broad joinder of claims allowed, particularly under Rule
18. See 3A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE IT 18.07[1] (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; 6A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1588
(2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,]; infra note 112.
9. FED. R. CIv. P. 18(a). Although the Rules themselves place no restric-
tion or requirement on the plaintiff's joinder of claims, the doctrine of res
judicata will, at times, encourage joinder of related claims. Under this doc-
trine, a defendant can plead res judicata as an affirmative defense in a subse-
quent action if the plaintiff seeks to raise claims that under the doctrine of res
judicata should have been brought in an earlier suit. See infra text accom-
panying notes 158-61, 217-19.
10. See generally Grove & Blume, Suing the Contractor for Construction
Defects and Delays, in CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: REPRESENTING THE OWNER,
§ 3.3 (1984) (explaining the measure of damages recoverable from the general
contractor for breach of contract); id. § 3.4 (discussing third-party beneficiary
claims against subcontractors); id. § 3.8 (discussing negligence claims).
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C.'1 Under the Rules, B and C may raise any claim they have
against the plaintiff as a counterclaim, 2 regardless of the rela-
tionship of these new claims to the original claims raised by the
plaintiff.' 3 Further, with only a few exceptions, B and C must
raise those claims they have against A that arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim.' 4 If
either of the defendants asserts a claim against the plaintiff,15
the plaintiff then becomes subject to the counterclaim rules as
to that defendant and must raise by reply any compulsory
counterclaims it has in response to the defendant's claims. 16
To the extent B wishes to raise a claim against C, the Rules
are more limiting. At this point in the litigation B and C are
not "opposing parties." Rather, they are "co-parties."' 7 The
11. An "opposing party" under the Rules, as interpreted by case law, is
one who has asserted a claim against another. See infra notes 47-49 and ac-
companying text. The claimant becomes an opposing party to the party sued.
I&!.
12. Rule 13(a) requires a pleader, in most circumstances, to bring any
claim the pleader has against an opposing party "if it arises out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Rule 13(b) allows the pleader to bring any claim the
pleader has against an opposing party "not arising out of the transaction or oc-
currence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." FED. R. CIV.
P. 13(b). Thus, these rules together generally allow pleading of any counter-
claim. Permissive counterclaims, however, must fall within the court's in-
dependent subject matter jurisdiction. See generally 3 W. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE q 13.19[1] (2d ed. 1989) (discussing support for and criticism
of requirement of independent jurisdictional grounds for permissive counter-
claim); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1422 (discussing
requirement of independent jurisdictional grounds for permissive
counterclaims).
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
14. Such counterclaims are compulsory unless 1) they have not matured
at the time the responsive pleading is to be served; 2) they require for adjudi-
cation third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; 3) at the
time of the action's commencement the claim is the subject of another pending
action; or 4) the court lacks in personam jurisdiction over the party potentially
subject to the compulsory counterclaim provision. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
15. Typical claims by a general contractor against an owner include claims
for breach of contract, for failure to make contract payments, or for breach of
an implied warranty of accuracy and sufficiency of the contract plans and spec-
ifications. See Currie, Stephenson & Beck, supra note 6, §§ 1.14-.15. Also, sub-
contractors may have a claim against the owner for tortious interference with
their business relationship. See, e.g., Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Nemours Found., 606
F. Supp. 995, 1005-06 (D. Del. 1985).
16. See generally 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 13.08, at
13-42 to -43.
17. "Co-parties" are parties on the same side of the main litigation. See
infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how this applies
to co-plaintiffs, see infra note 45.
1990]
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Rules label claims between co-parties "cross-claims.' 8 Unlike
opposing parties, co-parties, at least initially, are limited in the
claims they can bring against each other to those that arise out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
either the original action, a counterclaim, or that relate to any
property that is the subject matter of the original action, in-
cluding a claim for liability over 19 against a co-party.20 Once
such a claim is brought, however, this restriction is satisfied
and a co-party can bring any other claim it has against the
other co-party, even if it is totally unrelated to the suit to
date. 21 Thus, to get into the game, B must have a claim against
C with a sufficient relationship to the suit as it has progressed.
Once that claim is asserted, however, B then can raise claims
arising from any other dealings the parties have had, even if
they are totally unrelated to the particular building dispute
that prompted the litigation.
Co-party status differs from opposing party status in an-
other important way. Claims between co-parties always are
permissive, while claims a pleader has against an opposing
party often are compulsory.2 2 Unlike permissive claims, com-
pulsory claims are waived if not raised.2 3
Although in my hypothetical B and C initially are co-par-
ties, once one brings a claim against the other, the claimant be-
comes an opposing party and all the rules pertaining to
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
19. Id. As used here, a claim for "liability over" is generally a claim for
contribution or indemnification. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29; see
also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1446, at 361-63 (stat-
ing that impleader is proper when the third party is secondarily liable to the
defendant based on indemnity, contribution, or any other like theory).
20. Id.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a). See infra Parts II. C., IV. A. 3. Thus, B might
sue C for damages B suffered as a result of Cs malfeasance, or might seek in-
demnification or contribution from C for any liability B ultimately incurs in
A's suit against it. See Hoffman & Simmons, Suing the Subcontractor and Ma-
terial Supplier, in CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: REPRESENTING THE CONTRAC-
TOR §§ 8.1, 8.8 (1986). Once such a claim has been asserted, nonrelated claims
also may be joined. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
22. Compare FED R. CIv. P. 13(g) (stating that co-party cross-claims are
permissive) with FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (stating that transactionally related
claims against an opposing party usually are compulsory). See also 6 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1431, at 236-37 (discussing dis-
tinctions between cross-claims under Rule 13(g) and counterclaims under Rule
13(a)).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). See, e.g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417
U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974).
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opposing parties apply.24 Thus if B first raises a claim against
C, B becomes an opposing party to C. Bs claims against C are
governed by the rules pertaining to co-parties, while C's claims
against B are governed by the rules pertaining to claims against
opposing parties. Had C acted first, their roles would be
reversed.25
In connection with any of the counterclaims or cross-claims
raised by the parties, nonparties outside the litigation that the
claimant could have joined in the litigation if the claimant
brought the claim as a plaintiff in an independent action, may
be joined as co-defendants to the claim.26 For example, if B
cross-claims against C for negligence in carrying out its subcon-
tract and believes that a supplier also was at fault in causing
the problem at issue, B could bring that supplier in as a co-de-
fendant to the cross-claim.
Finally, any party against whom a claim has been asserted
can bring in by impleader a third-party "who is or may be liable
to [that party] for all or part of the... claim" asserted against
the party.27 Although initially limited to claims for liability
24. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
25. Although probably unintended, the shift from co-party to opposing
party status may make an additional difference beside that discussed in the
text. Rule 13(g) provides that a party may assert against a co-party a claim
that the co-party "is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a
claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g)
(emphasis added). In short, a claim for contingent liability is permissible. See
generally 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 14.08 (explaining
how the same language in Rule 14 provides for the acceleration of the time at
which a claim for liability, at present contingent, can be raised). The counter-
claim rules, however, make no explicit provision for raising contingent claims
and do not appear to allow them. See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
supra note 8, § 1446, at 374-75; see also 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 12, t 14.14 at 14-76 (stating that "the counterclaim procedure may not be
available if a claim for contribution or indemnification is categorized as a con-
tingent claim, and Rule 13 is construed narrowly to allow only matured
claims").
If this interpretation is correct, then upon a cross-claim the sued co-de-
fendant, by virtue of its shifting status, loses the ability to bring a contingent
claim for liability over against the cross-claimant. To assert the claim at all,
the sued co-defendant might need to sever the asserted cross-claim from the
action, thereby resurrecting co-party status, which would allow assertion of
the contingent claim. At that point the severed claim could be consolidated
with the original action to allow the entire dispute to be resolved in one pro-
ceeding. Cf id. 14.14, at 14-77 to 14-78 (describing a similar practice in the
context of contingent liability claims by a defendant against a co-plaintiff); 6 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1446, at 375-76 (same).
26. FED. R. Cw. P. 13(h).
27. FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a). But cf infra notes 84, 210 and accompanying
1990]
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over, once a party asserts such a claim, the party then can raise
any claims against the new party.28 In my hypothetical, B or C
might bring in D, the supplier, for indemnification or contribu-
tion in the event that A ultimately is successful in its claims
against B or C.29 Having raised the indemnification or contribu-
tion claim, B or C then could sue D for their own damages on
this building project or any other dispute they may have with
D.
D, then, is in an opposing party relationship with which-
ever party has asserted a claim against it, a co-party relation-
ship with any other third-party defendants brought in for
indemnification of the same claim, and is unaligned with re-
spect to A, the owner of the building and the original plaintiff.30
The Rules allow D to raise a claim against A, or A to raise a
claim against D, 31 but only if the claim arises out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintiff - A's claim against B as-
text (addressing permissibility of impleader actions by co-parties seeking to
pass on liability for cross-claims asserted against them).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a); see infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
29. See Bowers, Suing the Material Supplier, in CONSTRUCTION LITIGA-
TION: REPRESENTING THE OWNER § 5.3, at 35-36 (Supp. 1986) (concerning im-
pleading of suppliers by contractors).
In the usual case, claims for liability over against an outside party are
raised through Rule 14 impleader. Whether this should be the case when the
party seeking impleader also asserts cross-claims against existing parties aris-
ing out of the same transaction or occurrence that gives rise to the liability
over claim is unclear. Perhaps under those circumstances it would be more
appropriate to bring the third party in under Rule 13(h). Compare Federman
v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1979) (al-
lowing new parties to be joined under Rule 13(h) for indemnity in connection
with cross-claims for indemnity against existing co-defendants) with Connell
v. Bernstein-Macauley, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 111, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rejecting
use of Rule 13(h) in similar circumstances).
The device chosen may make a difference, because a party brought in
under Rule 13(h) would become a co-party of the party sued under the cross-
claim. If instead the party were impleaded by one of two co-defendants, the
party would have a more limited relationship with the plaintiff, as defined by
Rule 14, and would be unaligned with respect to the co-defendant of the third-
party plaintiff. The limitations this situation presents for the assertion of
claims between them is discussed infra text accompanying notes 35-36, 86-87,
189-93.
30. See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1458, at 447-
48.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a); see also Currie, Stephenson & Beck, supra note
6, at § 1.13 (discussing owner/supplier relationships); Brailsford, Suing the Ma-
terial Supplier, in CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: REPRESENTING THE OWNER




suming B impleads D.3 2 Once that threshold requirement is
met, the claimant (A or D) can join any other claims it has
against that opponent. 33 The claimant then becomes an oppos-
ing party to the person sued and the opposing party rules
apply.3 4
The Rules are silent about the relationship of D, the third-
party defendant, and the co-defendant of the third-party plain-
tiff. Thus, if B brings a third-party claim against D, the Rules
do not address how to treat any claims that might exist be-
tween C, the co-defendant of the third-party plaintiff B, and
D. 3 5 Substantial confusion exists over what claims, if any,
should be permitted between C and D. If claims are permitted,
there is additional confusion about what procedural devices
govern them.36
In sum, whether a claim is permissive or compulsory and
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a); see infra note 114 and accompanying text.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 78-79.
35. Because neither has yet asserted a claim against the other, C and D
are not opposing parties and thus fall outside the counterclaim rules. Im-
pleader under Rule 14 does not appear available to C because the Rule on its
face applies only to parties outside the litigation, and D is now a party in the
action, having been impleaded by B. But see infra notes 92-93 (citing cases
that argue for allowing Rule 14 impleader between third-party defendants and
a prior co-party). Although Rule 14 does authorize the third-party defendant
to make certain claims, it is silent with respect to claims of this kind. Finally,
the cross-claim rule is inapplicable because C and D do not meet the majority
definition of co-parties - parties of equal status in opposition to a common
claimant. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g); infra text accompanying note 48.
36. See Paur v. Crookston Marine, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 466, 471-72 (D.N.D. 1979)
(stating that co-defendant of third-party plaintiff cannot bring claim against
third-party defendant); Georgia Ports Auth. v. Construzioni Meccaniche Indus-
triali Genovesi, S.P.A., 119 F.R.D. 693, 694-95 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (allowing co-de-
fendant of third-party plaintiff to bring cross-claim against third-party
defendant); Hansen v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 246, 250-51
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (allowing co-defendant of third-party plaintiff to bring against
third-party defendant a Rule 13(h) claim tied to a counterclaim in the action,
despite the literal unavailability of Rule 13(h)); American Gen. v. Equitable
Gen., 87 F.R.D. 736, 738-39 (E.D. Va. 1980) (allowing claim of third-party de-
fendant against a co-defendant of the third-party plaintiff, as long as the claim
could have been brought as a separate action and consolidated with the instant
case); Malispina v. Farrah Mfg. Co., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 129, 129-30
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (refusing to allow co-defendant of third-party plaintiff to bring
against cross-claim third-party defendant, but assuming impleader would be
available); Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F. Supp. 5, 7 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(same); Fogel v. United Gas Improvement Co., 32 F.R.D. 202, 203-04 (E.D. Pa.
1963) (allowing co-defendant of third-party plaintiff to bring cross-claim
against third-party defendant). See generally infra text accompanying notes
87-108, 189-93, 206-12 (discussing claims between co-defendants of the third-
party plaintiff and the third-party defendant).
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whether it requires some relationship to other claims already
asserted,37 or can be totally unrelated to other claims in the
proceeding, turns on the relationship of the parties in the litiga-
tion at the time the claim is asserted. Claims by a party in re-
sponse to a claim asserted against it are compulsory if they
arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject of
the opposing party's claim; permissive if they do not, regardless
of the setting in which the initial party's claim arose.
The Rules do not restrict claims between the original
plaintiff and defendant; these claims need not be related to
other claims in the lawsuit. The same is true for claims as-
serted by a party in response to a claim asserted against it. The
Rules do restrict cross-claims, third-party claims and claims be-
tween the plaintiff and third-party defendants; these claims
must have a relationship to the lawsuit. Once the pleader has
asserted a qualifying claim,38 however, the pleader may then
37. The exact relationship of claims required varies by the type of claim
asserted. A compulsory counterclaim must arise "out of the transaction or oc-
currence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim" and it must
involve a claim that has matured at the time of its assertion. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 13(a); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1446, at 374-75
(stating that a counterclaim for contribution or indemnity is not available be-
cause the claim is contingent and has not yet matured). Cross-claims are
broader, allowing assertion of a claim "arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counter-
claim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the
original action." FED. R. CIv. P. 13(g). This Rule also allows a co-party to
bring a contingent claim against the other for liability over. Id. The third-
party practice provisions of Rule 14 set different relational requirements in
different settings. A defendant in response to a complaint, a plaintiff in re-
sponse to a counterclaim, and a third-party defendant in response to a third-
party complaint may assert a claim against an outside party "who is or may be
liable to them for all or part of the claim asserted against them." FED. R. Civ.
P. 14(a), (b). The impleaded party and the claimant may assert claims against
each other if the claims arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the claim, liability for which may be passed through to the
impleaded party. Id
A number of these provisions require that claims asserted must "[arise]
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter" of a designated
claim previously raised in the litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), 13(g), 14.
Although this phrase is subject to a number of different interpretations and
may vary in meaning depending on the rule involved, the preferred view is to
read the phrase expansively and to construe it similarly in each of the provi-
sions. See 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 13.13, at 13-64 to -
68; 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1410, at 50, § 1431, at
237, § 1432, at 244; see also Robertson, Joinder of Claims and Parties - Rules
13, 14, 17, and 18, 52 MIss. L.J. 37, 51-55 (1982) (presenting a similar analysis in
the context of the analagous Mississippi procedural rules).




join with it any claim, regardless of its relationship to the
claims previously asserted in the action. In other words, re-
stricted claims that a party would not be able to assert by them-
selves can be asserted after the party pleads a qualifying claim.
Thus, much like in some forms of poker, the Rules require a
qualifying claim to get in the game (jacks or better to open),
but once that requirement is met the Rules allow the parties to
play their hands as they wish.
II. ON READING THE RULES
Although there is apparent consensus among courts and
commentators that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure work
as I have described them,39 the path to that conclusion is by no
means clear, particularly to those who lack intimate familiarity
with Rules 13, 14, and 18. Neither the meaning of the language
in the Rules nor the logic underlying the varying treatment the
Rules accord claims of differently aligned parties is immedi-
ately apparent. This section addresses the problems raised in
interpreting the text of Rules 13, 14, and 18. The next section
untangles the competing policies at work.
A. RULE 13 - OPPOSING PARTIES VERSUS Co-PARTIES
Rule 13 splits the world into two groups, opposing parties
and co-parties. Opposing parties are subject to the counter-
claim rules.40 With only a few exceptions, these rules require
the pleading of claims one has against any opposing party if the
claims arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of the opposing party's claim,4 1 and allow the plead-
ing of any other claim against the opposing party.42
Counterclaims typically are raised by defendants against
plaintiffs.43
Co-parties are subject to the cross-claim rule.44 Such
claims always are permissive and are limited to that those
claims arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of either the original action or a counterclaim, or
39. See infra notes 51, 79, 86, 112-114 and accompanying text.
40. FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a).
41. Md See also supra note 14.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
43. Under the current interpretation of the Rules, however, any party
against whom a claim is brought becomes an opposing party, despite the
party's original status in the litigation. Because the Rules do not make this
shift in status clear, some amendment is necessary. See infra Part IV. A. 1.
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g).
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that relate to any property that is the subject of the original ac-
tion.45 Cross-claims typically are raised between co-defendants.
Given these distinctions, a party failing to recognize the
proper status of another party can be disadvantaged signifi-
cantly. Wrongly perceiving another as an opposing party may
lead a party to raise claims related to the litigation for fear that
these claims are compulsory, when, if given a choice, the party
would have withheld them. Further, such a party also might
raise unrelated claims alone only to have the court dismiss
them because co-parties are not allowed to raise unrelated
claims without a valid cross-claim as an anchor. Of more con-
cern is the party who does not realize that its opponent is an
opposing party. Here, a party's failure to raise a related claim
because of the mistaken belief that the claim is permissive can
lead to waiver of the claim in subsequent litigation for failure
to raise a compulsory counterclaim. 46
As written, the counterclaim rules cover claims against an
"opposing party," while the cross-claim rule speaks of claims
against a "co-party." 47 Although the terms are not defined by
the Rules themselves, an "opposing party" typically is defined
as one who has asserted a claim against the prospective coun-
45. Id. As written, Rule 13(g) allows a co-party to assert a cross-claim as
long as the claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of either the original action or a counterclaim in the action. In short,
as long as the claim arises out of the same basic controversy as the core dis-
pute (the original claim and counterclaims) the Rule allows a cross-claim. See
6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1432, at 250 (finding a
narrower interpretation contrary to the "explicit and unqualified language of
Rule 13(g)"). Some courts, however, give the language a narrower reading.
For example, the Third Circuit, in Danner v. Anskis, 256 F.2d 123 (3d Cir.
1958), stated that:
The purpose of Rule 13(g) is to permit a defendant to state as a
cross-claim a claim against a co-defendant growing out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action or
relating to any property that is the subject matter of that action, and
to permit a plaintiff against whom a defendant has filed a counter-
claim to state as a cross-claim against a co-plaintiff a claim growing
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
counterclaim or relating to any property that is the subject matter of
that counterclaim .... In other words, a cross-claim is intended to
state a claim which is ancillary to a claim stated in a complaint of
counterclaim which has previously been filed against the party stating
the cross-claim.
Id. at 124. See also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, UNDERSTANDING
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.8, at 358 (1985) (describing the Danner position as the
general rule, at least with respect to claims by co-plaintiffs).
46. See, e.g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974).
47. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), (b) (counterclaim rules) with FED. R.
Civ. P. 13(g) (cross-claim provision).
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terclaimant in the first instance. Co-parties are parties on the
same side of the main litigation.48 Thus, in our hypothetical in
the preceding section, A is an opposing party to B and C be-
cause A has asserted a claim against them. B and C initially are
co-parties to each other because they occupy the same status in
the litigation and do not have any claims pending against each
other.
One might read the Rules as freezing the status of the par-
ties in time. Under this reading, A always will be an opposing
party to B and C, and B and C always will be co-parties to each
other, regardless of how the litigation proceeds. 49 As discussed
later, strong policy arguments support this view.50 Neverthe-
less, most courts and commentators read the Rules to incorpo-
rate a shifting status based on the actual posture of the
parties.5 1 Thus, if B brings a cross-claim against C, B then be-
48. See, e.g., Augustin v. Mughal, 521 F.2d 1215, 1216 (8th Cir. 1975); Stahl
v. Ohio River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1970).
49. Language in some cases can be read to support this view. For exam-
ple, in Stahl the court wrote:
Cross-claims are litigated by parties on the same side of the main lit-
gation; counterclaims are litigated between opposing parties to the
principal action.
424 F.2d at 55. More recently, a district court in Illinois, citing Stahl,
commented:
By simple statutory definition, a cross-claim is a claim asserted
against a co-party, e.g., a co-defendant, distinguishing it from a coun-
terclaim which is brought against an opposing party, e.g., defendant
versus plaintiff. In simpler terms, 'cross-claims are litigated by parties
on the same side of the main litigation; counterclaims are litigated be-
tween opposing parties to the principal action.'
United States v. American Centennial Ins. Co., No. 84 C 4645 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31,
1985) (WESTLAW, Allfeds, at 5).
In construing its state provision, which mirrors the Federal Rules, the
Vermont Supreme Court wrote:
A cross-claim differs from a counterclaim in that a counterclaim is
available only to a defendant against a plaintiff, whereas a cross-claim
is brought by a plaintiff against a co-plaintiff or by a defendant
against a co-defendant.
Associated Mortgage Investors v. Haystack Corp., 140 Vt. 125, 128, 435 A.2d
964, 965-66 (1981).
50. See infra Parts II. A. 3., III. E.1.
51. See, e.g., Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir.
1971); James E. McFadden, Inc. v. Bechtel Power Corp., No. 85-6945 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 3) (WESTLAW, Allfeds, at 9-11), aff'd 806 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986); Chi-
cago Freight Car Leasing Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 66 F.R.D. 400, 402
(N.D. Ill. 1975); see also 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12,
13.12[1], at 13-58, $ 13.34[1], at 13-209 to -210 (illustrating shifts in status); G.
SHREVE & P. RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 58, at 227
(1989) (same). But cf Hall v. General Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175, 184 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (stating that "an answering cross-claim might well be compulsory
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comes an opposing party to C because they now are formally
opposing each other on a claim.52
Several arguments have been advanced to support the view
that the drafters of the Rules intended the status of the parties
to shift with the pleading of a cross-claim. The history of Rule
13 provides some support for this interpretation. The interpre-
tation is bolstered further by analogy to Rule 14, which like
Rule 13(g), deals with claims for liability over. Because Rule 14
explicitly authorizes counterclaims in response to a claim for li-
ability over, one might assume that the same should be true at
least for cross-claims for liability over, if not more broadly.53
Nevertheless, neither argument is conclusive and strong policy
arguments support the contrary interpretation. 54 Each argu-
ment is addressed in turn.
1. The History of Rule 13
In the first public draft of Rule 13, the Rule defined coun-
terclaims as claims that "the defendant has ... against a plain-
tiff" to be raised in the "answer." The Rule defined cross-
claims as "claims by one defendant against another."55 This
[as a counterclaim]," suggesting the issue is undecided) (emphasis added).
State courts construing provisions similar to Rule 13 usually have adopted the
federal interpretation. See, e.g., Miller v. LHKM, 751 P.2d 1356, 1359-60
(Alaska 1988); Mohr v. State Bank, 241 Kan. 42, 51, 734 P.2d 1071, 1079 (1987);
Jorge Constr. Co. v. Weigel Excavating and Grading Co., 343 N.W.2d 439, 443
(Iowa 1984); Ex parte Reliance Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (Ala. 1981);
Ecker v. Clark, 428 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Ky. 1968). But see Jacobs v. Corley, 732
S.W.2d 910, 914 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that the parties' status does not
shift upon assertion of a cross-claim).
52. The question of whether the parties' status shifts is important in sev-
eral respects. If co-parties remain co-parties throughout the litigation, they
will not be required to raise any claims they have against the other co-party
because Rule 13(a) does not apply to co-parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Co-par-
ties are limited, however, in the claims they may raise initially to those with
an appropriate relationship to the lawsuit. If, in contrast, party status shifts
upon assertion of a cross-claim such that the claimant becomes an opposing
party, the party responding to the claim is forced to raise most related claims
against the claimant or they are waived. The claimant, however, is allowed to
raise any claims even if they bear no transactional relationship to the other
claims in the lawsuit. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b). See supra text accompanying
notes 10-16.
53. See, e.g., Ecker v. Clark, 428 S.W. 2d 620, 621 (Ky. 1968) (applying this
line of reasoning to Rule 13(g)). See also infra Part II. A. 2. (comparing Rules
13 and 14).
54. See infra Parts II. A. 3., III. E. 1.
55. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR
CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF
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language supports the view that counterclaims are between de-
fendants and plaintiffs and cross-claims are between defend-
ants, presumably without any change in status if a cross-claim
is filed. Without explanation, the next and all subsequent
drafts of the Rule use the "opposing party" and "co-party" lan-
guage of the present Rule.56
In addition, these later drafts speak of raising counter-
claims and cross-claims in "pleadings" rather than in the "an-
swer."5' 7 The implications of this change become apparent upon
analyzing Rule 7(a), which identifies the pleadings allowed
under the Federal Rules. Under this provision, the response to
a claim for relief, including that pleader's own claim for relief
filed in response, usually is filed in an "answer."5 8 If the coun-
terclaim rules were limited to claims raised by defendants
against plaintiffs, the term "answer" would be sufficient for
purposes of Rule 13. Some claims for relief asserted by one
who has been sued, however, are raised in pleadings other than
an answer, such as a reply in response to a counterclaim and a
third-party answer in response to a third-party complaint.59
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Rule 18, at 32-33 (May 1936) (discussing Rule 18
language, now contained in Rule 13) [hereinafter 1936 Draft].
56. By the April 1937 draft, the counterclaim and cross-claim rules had
been moved from Rule 18 to Rule 13 and changed to include the opposing
party and co-party language. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COM-
MITEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES Rule 13, at 36-38
(April 1937) [hereinafter 1937 Draft]. The advisory committee notes accompa-
nying the Rule make no mention of the change, nor was it discussed in the
principal public debate preceding the adoption of the Rules. See generally 62
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Schedule D, at 705-07
(providing an extensive bibliography of articles on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure prior to their adoption). A review of the proceedings of the highly
influential Institutes on the Federal Rules sponsored by the American Bar As-
sociation in Cleveland, Washington and New York uncovered no direct refer-
ence to the change. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION IN-
STITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 177-394 (1938) (reprinting proceedings of the insti-
tute held in Cleveland) [hereinafter Cleveland Institute]; AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE IN-
STITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY
(1939). I have not reviewed the private papers of the drafters on file in four
law school libraries. Compare Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d 272,
275, 281 (4th Cir.) (relying on the private papers of the Rules' drafters to inter-
pret the Rules), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910 (1982) with id. at 281-82 (Butzner,
J., dissenting) (questioning the private papers' value as interpretive guides).
57. 1937 Draft, supra note 56, Rule 13.
58. The Rule provides that a party must respond to a complaint and a
cross-claim in an answer. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a).
59. I&
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Use of the broader term "pleading" as the vehicle for raising a
counterclaim may have been intended to encompass these other
devices as well, and to broaden generally the reach of the coun-
terclaim provisions. 60
Perhaps these changes in the Rules were intended to make
the counterclaim provisions applicable to all parties responding
to a claim asserted against them, but without explanation of the
changes one cannot be sure. The changes may have been made
to meet other, more limited concerns. For example, the change
in the counterclaim rule also was accompanied by a change in
the joinder of claims provision. As originally proposed, that
rule stated in part:
A party may in one complaint or counterclaim state ... as many dif-
ferent claims... as he may have against an opposing party.6 1
In subsequent drafts the rule provided:
The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a counter-
claim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim,
may join... as many claims... as he may have against an opposing
party .... There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or third-party
claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14 respectively are
satisfied.
62
Taken together, these changes in the counterclaim and joinder
of claims provisions might be no more than an attempt to alter
specific practices under Equity Rule 30, the precursor to Fed-
eral Rule 13.63 Equity Rule 30 defined counterclaims in equity
as claims raised by the "defendant" against the "plaintiff" in an
"answer." Under the Equity Rule, plaintiffs were not allowed
to raise in a reply a counterclaim to a counterclaim. 64 The lan-
guage changes in the counterclaim and joinder of claims rules
may have been focused solely on changing this result, without
any intention of addressing the possible changing status of co-
parties subject to a cross-claim.
This narrow interpretation of the changes is supported fur-
ther by the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule
60. See, e.g., James E. McFadden, Inc. v. Bechtel Power Corp., No. 85-6945
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 3) (WESTLAW, Allfeds, at 9), aff'd, 806 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1986).
Cf Miller v. LHKM, 751 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Alaska 1988) (stressing use of term
"pleading" rather than "answer" in state counterclaim rule that mirrors Fed-
eral Rule 13(a) in this regard); Mohr v. State Bank, 241 Kan. 42, 51, 734 P.2d
1071, 1079 (1987) (same).
61. 1936 Draft, supra note 55, Rule 25. The provision as amended now ap-
pears as Rule 18.
62. 1937 Draft, supra note 56, Rule 18(a).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 original advisory committee note 1.
64. 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 13.03, at 13-24, 13.08,
at 13-42 to -43.
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13(a), which indicate that the Rule "is substantially former Eq-
uity Rule 30... broadened to include legal as well as equitable
counterclaims. '65 The Equity Rule provided for counterclaims
by defendants against plaintiffs and did not speak to cross-
claims, which had a different genesis. 66 Further, Equity Rule
30 was for the most part interpreted narrowly to speak only to
claims by original defendants against plaintiffs.67 Reference to
Equity Rule 30 in the advisory committee note, without ex-
plaining that an expansion was intended, at best is misleading.
It may even be read to support the view that co-parties do not
change status and become opposing parties subject to the coun-
terclaim rules, because that would not have occurred under the
Equity Rule. In summary, although the counterclaim provi-
sions in Rule 13 have been interpreted to apply to a co-party's
claim raised in response to a cross-claim, the history of Rule 13
does not conclusively establish that the rule's drafters intended
such a shift from co-party to opposing party status.6 8
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 original advisory committee note 1.
66. 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 13.34[1], at 13-203 n.1
(surveying case law evolution of cross-claims in equity). See generally R. MIL-
LAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 139-
42 (1952) (analyzing the right of defendants to assert cross-claims against co-
defendants under code pleading).
67. 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 13.05, 13.08 (report-
ing that Equity Rule 30 was construed narrowly as unavailable for counter-
claims by intervenors or by plaintiffs in response to counterclaims asserted
against them).
68. Even if the history of the Rules does not address the question directly,
the general thrust of the Rules may provide a guide. As Professor Resnik has
observed, "[t]he 1938 Rules deliberately liberalized joinder practice; as the
drafters discuss it, the idea was to permit a complete and thorough airing of a
dispute and then to conclude it once and for all." Resnik, Failing Faith: Adju-
dicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 521 (1986). From this
perspective, one might conclude that it is more likely that the drafters in-
tended to enlarge the counterclaim provisions to incorporate the claims of one
co-defendant sued by the other, as this would allow broader pleading through
the permissive counterclaim provision and compel the pleading of related
claims through the compulsory counterclaim provision. Doubt is cast on this,
however, by the writing of Professor Dobie, a member of the advisory commit-
tee that drafted the Rules. In describing the counterclaim and cross-claim pro-
visions he acknowledges that "Rule 13 makes generous and liberal provisions
as to counterclaims and cross-claims, with the idea of settling in a single civil
action the various claims of the parties." He still describes a counterclaim,
however, as a claim "by a defendant against a plaintiff," and a cross-claim as a
claim "by one defendant against a co-defendant," without ever mentioning a




2. Rule 13 and the Rule 14 Analogy
Because both the cross-claim rule (Rule 13(g)) and the im-
pleader rule (Rule 14) address actions for liability over, com-
parison of the language of each is instructive. The former rule
applies when the claim is between co-parties, while the latter
applies when the claim is between a current party already de-
fending a claim and an outside party who will be brought into
the action. Unlike Rule 13(g), Rule 14 specifically states that in
response to the liability over claim, the third-party defendant
"shall make . . . any counterclaims against the third-party
plaintiff.., as provided in Rule 13."69 How this affects inter-
pretation of the cross-claim provision of Rule 13(g), however, is
not clear. One could argue that the drafters' failure to mention
explicitly in Rule 13(g) that once sued, the co-party could raise
counterclaims against the claimant, while doing so explicitly in
Rule 14, suggests that a sued co-party does not acquire opposing
party status in relation to the claimant. On the other hand, it is
difficult to find a policy rationale to support different treat-
ment. There appears to be no reason why a party subject to a
liability over claim should be treated differently simply because
in the one instance the party was in the litigation from the
start, at the request of the plaintiff, while in the other it was
brought in later, typically by a party other than the plaintiff.70
Thus, affording counterclaim treatment to claims raised in re-
sponse to a Rule 14 claim for liability over presents conflicting
messages on the treatment of such claims in the cross-claim
context.
3. A Contrary Approach
Although both the history of Rule 13 and the treatment of
analogous claims under Rule 14 can be read to support the ma-
jority view that a co-party's status shifts once a claim is brought
against it, this evidence is not conclusive. On a policy level,
reading Rule 13 to freeze the parties in their initial alignment
may better comport with the spirit of the Rules.
One policy concern underlying the Rules is a desire to
avoid the inadvertant waiver of a claim resulting from a party's
failure to plead it. For example, courts have given a flexible in-
terpretation to the compulsory counterclaim rule, broadly in-
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
70. See Ecker v. Clark, 428 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Ky. 1968) (finding "no dis-
cernible reason" for treating Rule 13(g) and Rule 14 situations differently).
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terpreting the "transaction and occurrence" language when a
party affirmatively seeks to raise a counterclaim, but narrowly
interpreting the language when a party is challenged for failure
to raise a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier action.7? Simi-
larly here, given the substantial possibility that an original co-
party may not be aware that status shift accompanies the filing
of a cross-claim against it, it might be better to read Rule 13(a)
narrowly and avoid the inadvertent loss of a claim.72 Alterna-
tively, in Section IV, this Article suggests ways the Rules can
be amended to alert parties to the problem of shifting status.73
B. RULE 14
As written, Rule 14(a) poses two major interpretive
problems. First, the Rule is misleading with regard to what
claims are allowed or required under third-party practice. Sec-
ond, the Rule fails to address adequately the permissibility of
third-party claims in complex settings.
1. Claims Allowed or Required Under Rule 14
In the simple case in which A sues B who impleads C, Rule
14 defines which claims each may raise against the other. B, re-
ferred to in the Rule as the third-party plaintiff, "may cause a
summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
plaintiff."74 C, in turn, is instructed to raise any counterclaims
it has against B and is allowed to assert any claims it has
against A, provided the claims arise out of the transaction or oc-
currence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff.75 This same restriction applies
to the plaintiff's claims against the third-party defendant.76
On its face, Rule 14 primarily authorizes limited claims. B
is authorized only to bring claims for liability over against C. C
then may bring any claims it has against B as counterclaims. A
and C may each sue the other, but only if the claims they raise
are transactionally related to the initial litigation between A
71. See, e.g., Aeroquip Corp. v. Chunn, 526 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ala.
1981); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1410, at 79.
72. See infra Part III. E. 1. (discussing the policy implications from shift-
ing status).
73. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.





and B. Further, with the exception of some claims between C
and B, all of the claims are permissive.77
In reality, other principles alter this picture radically,
although a party reading the text of Rule 14 would be unaware
of them. As discussed earlier, the prevailing interpretation is
that parties, regardless of their original status, become opposing
parties once a claim has been asserted against them.78 Thus, if
A sues C or C sues A, the party who brought the claim becomes
an opposing party and the counterclaim rules apply.79 As dis-
cussed in the next section, the limitations on pleading particu-
lar kinds of claims is only a threshold requirement. Once it is
met, any manner of claim may be brought against that party by
operation of Rule 18.80
2. The Permissibility of Third-Party Claims in Complex
Settings
In two major respects it is unclear how courts should apply
Rule 14 in more complex settings. The Rule expressly autho-
rizes impleader by a defending party in response to a claim by
the plaintiff,81 by a plaintiff in response to a counterclaim,8 2
and by a third-party defendant in response to an "action against
the third-party defendant. '8 3 The Rule is silent, however,
about whether impleader can be raised by a co-party subject to
a cross-claim. Whether the omission is intentional or an over-
sight is unclear.84 The proper interpretation turns on the com-
77. I& Because C is instructed to bring counterclaims against B, those
that fall within Rule 13(a) are compulsory. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
78. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Lindquist v. Quinones, 79 F.R.D. 158, 161 (D. St. Croix 1978);
3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, % 14.17, at 14-86; 6 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1404, at 20. But see Developments in the
Law - Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REV. 874, 975
(1958) [hereinafter Developments] (arguing that the parties can bring only
compulsory counterclaims, not permissive counterclaims, in this context).
80. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(b).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The degree to which impleader is available to
the third-party defendant is unclear. By its language, the Rule allows liability
over "for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-party
defendant." Id. (emphasis added). Perhaps use of the term "action" is meant
broadly to encompass any claims raised against the third-party defendant in
the proceeding. On the other hand, use of the limiting phrase "the claim"
rather than a broader one, such as "any claims," may suggest impleader should
be limited to those impleader claims of the third-party defendant arising out of
the third-party claim raised against it.
84. Until 1966, the language of Rule 14(a) spoke of a "defendant" raising a
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parative weight given to competing values at play in the
multiple claims setting.8 5
Rule 14 extensively details the claims that can be asserted
between third-party defendants and the third-party plaintiff,
the original plaintiff, and any co-defendants the third-party de-
fendant may have. 6 Rule 14 is silent, however, concerning how
courts should treat claims between third-party defendants and
co-defendants of the third-party plaintiff.8 7 Although the
Rule's silence can be read to disallow such claims, most courts
find a way to hear them. The rationale for doing so, however,
varies. Courts and commentators have articulated four differ-
ent approaches to this problem.
Some courts treat the co-defendant of the third-party plain-
tiff and the third-party defendant as co-parties.8 8 The co-par-
third-party complaint for liability over concerning the "plaintiff's claim
against him." FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a), 374 U.S. 865, 881 (1962). In 1966 the Rule
was amended, without explanation, replacing the word "defendant" with the
term "defending party." FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The phrase "defending party"
standing alone could be read broadly to encompass anyone defending against a
claim, including a sued co-defendant. Because the Rule retains the require-
ment that the defending party seek liability over from a claim against it by the
plaintiff, however, this would not appear to be the case.
Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane write that "Rule 14 is available to
any defending party." 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8,
§ 1442, at 293. Yet their subsequent text only mirrors the impleader provisions
set forth explicitly in the Rule. Id
85. See infra text accompanying notes 168-75, 208-12.
86. Yet another ambiguity arises here. Under Rule 14(a) the third-party
defendant is allowed to raise any "cross-claims [it has] against other third-
party defendants as provided in Rule 13." FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). To the extent
a third-party plaintiff impleads multiple third-party defendants for liability
over on the same claim, the provision clearly applies. Suppose instead that
two co-defendants in a suit each bring impleader claims against different third-
party defendants. Whether cross-claims between the third-party defendants
would be proper turns on whether they would be treated as co-parties within
the meaning of Rule 13(g). See Paur v. Crookston Marine, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 466,
471-72 (D.N.D. 1979) (disallowing a cross-claim under these circumstances).
87. For a brief discussion of these types of claims in a hypothetical case,
see supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
88. Nowhere in the Rules is the term "co-party" defined. Most courts and
commentators limit co-party treatment to parties having like status, such as
co-defendants. See, e.g., Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1970).
An original co-defendant and a third-party defendant have a different status
and thus would not be co-parties. See Hansen v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
116 F.R.D. 246, 248-49 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Paur v. Crookston Marine, Inc., 83
F.R.D. 466, 471-72 (D.N.D. 1979); Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F.
Supp. 5, 6-7 (E.D. Pa. 1968); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8,
§ 1431, at 238; see also text accompanying supra notes 48-49 (defining co-party).
To avoid this result, some courts have adopted differing definitions for
what constitutes a co-party relationship. For example, in Georgia Ports Au-
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ties' claims then are covered by Rule 13(g), allowing the parties
to assert transactionally related claims, claims relating to the
property of the action, and claims for liability over.8 9
Other courts treat the question as one of impleader. On its
face, Rule 14 seems inapplicable because its language is limited
to the assertion of claims for liability over against one "not a
party to the action" who is brought in to defend.90 Here, the
third-party defendant already has been brought into the ac-
tion.91 To allow claims against parties already in a case, at least
one court has read the phrase "party to the action" to mean
party to the original action.92 Other courts and commentators
simply have assumed, without explaining, that impleader is
available despite the fact that the third-party defendant already
is a party.93 Under this approach, impleading of the third-party
defendant by one co-defendant has no bearing on the availabil-
ity of impleader for the other.
Taking the impleader approach to the status of the co-de-
fendant of the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defend-
ant is more limiting than treating them as co-defendants. First,
the only claim that can be asserted initially is one for im-
pleader.9 4 Second, this approach limits who can use the device.
Although either party could initiate a cross-claim, the im-
pleader claim is limited to the co-defendant of the third-party
thority v. Construzioni Meccaniche Industriali Genovesi, S.P.A., 119 F.R.D. 693
(S.D. Ga. 1988), the court construed 'co-party' to mean any party that is not
an opposing party." Id. at 695 (emphasis in original). Claims between the co-
defendant of the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant fall here.
See also Fogel v. United Gas Improvement Co., 32 F.R.D. 202, 204 (E.D. Pa.
1963) (defining a co-party as one "in conjunction" with another, which the
court indicated would include the co-defendant of the third-party plain-
tiff/third-party defendant relationship).
89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g).
90. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
91. See, e.g., Georgia Ports Auth. v. Construzioni Meccaniche Industriali
Genovesi, S.P.A., 119 F.R.D. 693, 694 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (stating that co-defendant
of third-party plaintiff cannot assert impleader claims against third-party de-
fendant because third-party defendant already is a party to the action); Ameri-
can Gen. v. Equitable Gen., 87 F.R.D. 736, 738 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stating that
third-party defendant cannot assert impleader claim against co-defendant of
third-party plaintiff because co-defendant already is a party to the action).
92. Malaspina v. Farah Mfg. Co., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 129, 129-
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
93. See Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F. Supp. 5, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1431, at 237-38; see also 3
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 14.14, at 14-75 to -77 (acknowl-
edging that some courts allow Rule 14 impleader among those already parties).
94. 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1431, at 237-38.
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plaintiff, because impleader is available only against one not a
party to the original action and only the third-party defendant
meets that criteria.95
Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane seem to endorse both
approaches, treating the claim by the co-defendant of the third-
party plaintiff against the third-party defendant as an im-
pleader claim96 and the claim by the third-party defendant
against the co-defendant of the third-party plaintiff as a cross-
claim.9 7 Whatever logic may support this result,98 it is difficult
to square with the language of the Rules.99
A third approach, available in some circumstances, is to use
95. See Malaspina v. Farah Mfg. Co., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 129,
129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Malaspina case may not be this limiting. In al-
lowing the co-defendant of the third-party plaintiff to assert an impleader
claim against the third-party defendant, the court stressed that the third-party
defendant is not a party to the original action, only to the third-party action.
Id. Because the co-defendant of the third-party plaintiff is a stranger to the
third-party action, perhaps the third-party plaintiff should be able to bring
that party into that hypothetically separate proceeding.
96. 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1431, at 237-38.
97. 1& § 1456, at 439-40. If a defendant were to bring a cross-claim against
a co-defendant and join an additional party under Rule 13(h), the co-defendant
sued and the party brought in would be co-parties subject to the cross-claim
rule. Professors Wright and Miller argue that, by analogy, the same should be
true for a party brought in under Rule 14. Id
98. Assume again a situation in which A sues B and C, and B impleads D.
B may implead D only if B has a claim for liability over, otherwise it could not
bring D into the lawsuit except as a co-party to a counterclaim or cross-claim.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h), 14. To say that C cannot now bring a claim against D
in the original action and must file a separate suit treats C unequally.
Although both B and C start with an equal chance to implead D, once one acts,
the other loses the right to do so. Not only does this seem unfair (why should
C be treated differently than B), it also creates a race to file the first impleader
action to preserve one's rights at the expense of the rights of others. See Geor-
gia Ports Auth. v. Construzioni Meccaniche Industriali Genovesi, S.P.A., 119
F.R.D. 693, 694-95 (S.D. Ga. 1988); infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
When focusing on the right of the third-party defendant to sue the co-de-
fendant of the third-party plaintiff, recourse to the cross-claim rule seems ap-
propriate. Had B raised a cross-claim against C and desired to implead D, B
might have brought D in under Rule 13(h). FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h). In those
circumstances, C and D would be considered co-parties and would be free to
raise cross-claims against each other. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g). From D's perspec-
tive the device used to bring it into the litigation in no way affects its relation-
ship to C. Therefore, D should have the same rights against C in either
circumstance. See supra note 97.
99. Rule 14(a) specifically provides that the third-party defendant "shall
make any ... cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided in
Rule 13," thereby implying that a "co-party" is one of like status, which the co-
defendant of the third-party plaintiff is not. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
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Rule 13(h). 10 0 This provision provides that "[p]ersons other
than those made parties to the original action may be made par-
ties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with [the
party joinder rules]."'0 1 Under one interpretation, Rule 13(h) is
limited to situations when a party attempts to bring outside
parties into the proceeding; it thus would have no applicability
to claims involving the third-party defendant and the co-party
of the third-party plaintiff, because both are already in the pro-
ceeding.10 2 Others, however, have stretched the Rule to reach
claims between the third-party defendant and the co-defendant
in the original action if the asserted claim is tied sufficiently to
a proper counterclaim or cross-claim in the suit.'0 3
Finally, some courts require that any claim between the co-
defendant of the third-party plaintiff and the third-party de-
fendant be brought as a separate action, which then might be
consolidated with the initial suit. 0 4 Alternatively, the court
could sever the existing third-party claim, freeing the scene for
the co-defendant to assert an indemnity claim against the com-
mon third-party defendant, and then reconsolidate the ac-
tion. 10 5 The unnecessary circuity these approaches require lies
behind the movement by some courts to read the Rules cre-
atively to allow the claims as cross-claims, third-party claims, or
Rule 13(h) claims.10 6 The logic of creatively reading the Rules
100. See, e.g., Hansen v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 246, 250-51
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(h).
102. See generally 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8,
§ 1435, at 272 (stating that "[a] person cannot be made an additional party
under Rule 13(h) if he already is a party to the action").
103. See, e.g., Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250-51; cf. supra notes 29, 98 (discussing
the interplay of impleader and Rule 13(h)); 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 13, 14.17, at 14-85 n.4 (suggesting that Rule 13(h) might be used
by a third-party defendant against a plaintiff even though the plaintiff is al-
ready in the litigation).
104. See American Gen. v. Equitable Gen., 87 F.R.D. 736, 738-39 (E.D. Va.
1980) (discussing this possibility in dicta).
105. See, e.g., Georgia Ports Auth. v. Construzioni Meccaniche Industriali
Genovesi, S.P.A., 119 F.R.D. 693, 695 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 1988). See generally 3
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 14.14, at 14-77 to -78 (describing
this procedure); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1446, at
375-76 (same).
106. See, e.g., Georgia Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695 (stating that in light of
the admonition of Federal Rule 1 to construe the Rules "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," the cross-claim rule
should be read to encompass claims by a co-defendant of the third-party plain-
tiff against the third-party defendant to avoid requiring the filing of an in-
dependent action to be consolidated); Hansen v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
116 F.R.D. 246, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (relying on Rule 1 to construe Rule 13(h) to
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to allow directly what otherwise can be accomplished only indi-
rectly makes sense, however, only when the more complicated
alternative in fact is available.1 0 7 For example, if an independ-
ent action subject to consolidation would not lie because of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, or venue
concerns, reading the Rules to permit a party to assert the
claim in the original action does more than simply allow the
same result more easily. Reading the Rules to allow a party to
assert the claim still may be justified, but an independent ra-
tionale would be necessary to do so. Ultimately, choosing
among these four approaches is a matter of policy. The policies
at work here and the proper trade-off among them are dis-
cussed in Section 111.108
C. RULE 18(a)
On first reading, Rule 18(a) is unassuming. It provides:
A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as
alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the
party has against an opposing party.1 0 9
On its face this Rule is subject to at least two interpreta-
tions. The Rule can be read to mean that depending on a
party's status in the litigation, that party may bring together as
many claims as it has arising from that status."x 0 For example,
allow a claim by a third-party defendant against a co-defendant of the third-
party plaintiff to be brought in connection with a counterclaim against the
third-party plaintiff); American Gem, 87 F.R.D. at 738-39 (reading the Rules
broadly in light of Federal Rule 1 to allow a claim by a third-party defendant
against the co-defendant of the third-party plaintiff, rather than requiring the
filing of an independent action and a request for consolidation). See generally
6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1446, at 376 (stating that
in light of Rule 1, "there is much to be said for... simply allow[ing] impleader
as an initial matter without going through the ritual of severance followed by
impleader and consolidation").
107. For example, in American General v. Equitable General, 87 F.R.D. 736
(E.D. Va. 1980), the court allowed a third-party defendant to bring a claim
against a co-party of the third-party plaintiff, rather than requiring the parties
to bring a separate action to be consolidated with the original, but noted:
Had the movants alleged that there was a lack of complete diversity
between [the parties], or that [the complainant] could not have ob-
tained service of process over the movants, the movants clearly would
have been prejudiced by allowing the cross-claims to stand. Under
such circumstances, the Court would not have hesitated to grant the
motion to dismiss.
Id at 738.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 189-93.
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a).
110. Cf. Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1971)
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co-parties would be allowed to bring only claims meeting the
cross-claim rule against other co-parties. Under this interpreta-
tion, a co-party could join together as many qualifying cross-
claims as it has against another party, but it could not bring
with them a claim that would not meet the cross-claim provi-
sion of Rule 13(g). The same kind of limitation would be true
for impleader claims and claims between plaintiffs and third-
party defendants under Rule 14, because the language of Rule
14, without the aid of Rule 18, restricts the allowable claims."'
The fact that these Rules themselves say nothing about al-
lowing pleading of non-qualifying claims with qualifying claims
lends credence to this interpretation. Although this interpreta-
tion seems quite sensible, most courts and commentators have
given Rule 18 a broader meaning, reading the Rule to allow a
party to raise any claim against another party after raising a
qualifying claim. 112 In other words, if a co-party has a claim
that meets the cross-claim rule, the co-party may plead along
with it any claims it has against the other co-party, no matter
how unrelated. 1 1 3  Similarly, parties initially limited under
Rule 14 may raise any claim whatsoever once they assert a
qualifying claim under Rule 14.-14
(recognizing this as a possible interpretation of Rule 18, as applied in the im-
pleader context, but adopting the broader view that any claim can be brought
once a qualifying claim is asserted).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 27-34, 74-
80 (discussing operation of Rule 14(a)).
112. Although the Rules allow pleading of such claims, they do not purport
to speak to the courts' subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. See FED. R.
CIv. P. 82. To be heard, the claims must be supported by independent or ancil-
lary subject matter jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction will not be available if
the claims fail to share a sufficiently close relationship with anchor claims in
the litigation. See 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, q 18.07, at
18-22 to -23; 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1588, at 538.
See generally Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer: The
Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 103
(1983) (discussing the scope of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction).
113. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Pepper, 454 F.2d 626, 635 (2d Cir. 1972); see
also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 45, § 6.8, at 358 n.13
(recognizing that once a transactionally related claim is asserted, parties may
join any additional claims against their co-parties); 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 12, 13.40, at 13-241, % 18.04[4], at 18-19 n.4 (recognizing that
diverse and unrelated cross-claims can be joined under Rule 18(a)).
114. See Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d at 68-70; FDIC v. Linn,
671 F. Supp. 547, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Whicker v. CONRAIL, No. 85 C 6137
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds, at 5-6); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
BMC Indus., 113 F.R.D. 100, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United of Omaha Life Ins.
Co. v. Reed, 649 F. Supp. 837, 842 (D. Kan. 1986); Executive Fin. Servs. v.
Heart Chec, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 383, 384 (D. Colo. 1982); North Am. Corp. v. Halli-
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This result, if not compelled by the language of the Rule
itself, appears to be the one intended by the drafters. Prior to
1966, Rule 18 stated:
The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a counter-
claim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim
may join either as independent or as alternative claims as many
claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an op-
posing party. There may be a like joinder of claims when there are
multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satis-
fied. There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or third-party claims
if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14 respectively are satisfied.
1 1 5
It appears that most courts interpreted the last sentence as a
limitation on the kinds of claims that could be joined.116
In 1966, Rule 18(a) was amended to its present form. The
primary impetus for change came from limitations read into
the Rule by some courts in situations involving claims against
multiple parties.117 In response, the language incorporating the
burton Co., 71 F.R.D. 521, 522 (W.D. Okla. 1976); 3 MOoRE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 12, 13.06[3], at 13-36, 18.04[4], at 18-19; 6 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1452, at 414. But see de Haas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1968) (denying joinder of addi-
tional claims to impleader claim without mentioning Rule 18(a)), aff'd on
other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
A few courts acknowledge that Rule 18(a) allows joinder of non-qualifying
claims to claims qualifying under Rule 14, but appear to limit the non-qualify-
ing claims to ones transactionally related to the litigation. They do so appar-
ently by importing ancillary jurisdiction limitations into the reading of the
Rules themselves, even when ancillary jurisdiction is not itself an issue, such
as when the non-qualifying claims were supported by independent subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., E. F. Hutton Credit Corp. v. Lawrence L. Gipson,
M.D. Assocs., 36 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 896, 900 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Stiber v.
United States, 60 F.R.D. 668, 670 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
State courts, construing similar provisions, usually have adopted the pre-
vailing federal interpretation. See Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co. v. Black, 40
Conn. Supp. 63, 65, 480 A.2d 614, 616 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); Falcon Tankers,
Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 300 A.2d 231, 240 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Cohen v. Mc-
Laughlin, 250 Ga. 661, 662-63, 301 S.E.2d 37, 39-40 (1983); State ex rel Jacobs v.
Municipal Court, 30 Ohio St. 2d 239, 243, 284 N.E.2d 584, 587 (1972); cf. Atlas
Ltd. v. Kingman Warehouse Co., 357 N.W.2d 584, 586-87 (Iowa 1984) (allowing
joinder without reference to a provision similar to Rule 18(a)); Roebuck v.
Steuart, 76 Md. App. 298, 320-22, 544 A.2d 808, 818-19 (1988) (allowing joinder
despite the silence of the State's joinder of claims provision concerning im-
pleader claims).
115. FED. R. CIv. P. 18(a), 308 U.S. 25 (1939).
116. Cf. Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1971)
(noting that before the 1966 amendment to Rule 18 the vast weight of author-
ity held that a third-party plaintiff could not join together claims other than
those for liability over, but that after the amendment such joinder was
allowed).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 18 advisory committee note (1966).
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multi-party rules was eliminated.'" Little noticed in the com-
mentary at the time was the change in language pertaining to
cross-claims and impleader claims."19 Although this change
might simply be one of style, the advisory committee note, al-
beit cryptically, suggests otherwise. It provides in part:
Rule 18(a) is now amended not only to overcome the Christianson de-
cision and similar authority [concerning the interaction of the joinder
of claims and joinder of parties rules], but also to state clearly, as a
comprehensive proposition, that a party asserting a claim (an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim) may join as
many claims as he has against an opposing party.120
The advisory committee note cited two cases that address
whether a third-party plaintiff could join a related claim for di-
rect relief to an impleader claim under Rule 14.121 Noland Co.
v. Graver Tank & Mfg., Co.,122 which is cited with approval, al-
lowed joinder, but Humphrey v. Security Aluminum Co., 123
which garnered a "but cf." cite,2 4 did not and the latter was the
majority rule.125 Citation of these cases in this context seems to
indicate the drafters' desire to allow the appending of non-qual-
ifying claims to qualifying claims under Rule 18.n6 The over-
whelming majority of cases and commentators concur.127
In summary, like Rules 13 and 14, Rule 18 as written is am-
biguous. Unfortunately, these ambiguities make it difficult for
parties engaged in multi-claim litigation to always know their
rights and duties under the Rules. Beyond the language
problems, these provisions reflect policy compromises embed-
ded in the Federal Rules that are open to question. These pol-




121. Id. (the citation read: "See Noland Co., Inc. v. Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co., 301 F.2d 43, 49-51 (4th Cir. 1962); but cf. C. W. Humphrey Co. v. Security
Alum. Co., 31 F.R.D. 41 (E.D. Mich. 1962)").
122. 301 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962).
123. 31 F.R.D. 41 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
124. See supra note 121.
125. See Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d at 68 (canvassing the
relevant case law).
126. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (II), 81 HARv. L. REV. 591, 595-
97 (1968) (comments by the reporter for the 1966 amendments to the Federal
Rules, indicating that this reading was intended).
127. See supra notes 113-14.
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III. CONFLICTING POLICIES AND RESULTING
COMPROMISES
As described above, depending on context a claim may be
compulsory or permissive, and may require a qualifying rela-
tionship to the lawsuit. This variable treatment arises from the
policy choices and compromises inherent in the Federal Rules.
In general, the Rules reflect the interplay and accommoda-
tion of several sometimes conflicting policies. Overall, the
Rules attempt to balance the rights of litigants to control their
own cases against the systemic desire to process claims effi-
ciently.128 In the search for efficiency, the Rules seek to en-
courage pleading of multiple claims in a single proceeding,
while avoiding the inefficiency and complexity occasioned by
multi-claim litigation. 2 9 More specifically, the conflicting poli-
cies the Rules seek to accommodate include furthering the liti-
gants' control over how the litigation proceeds, encouraging
efficiency by resolving entire controversies in one suit, preserv-
ing the plaintiff's proprietary interest in the litigation, and en-
suring that all litigants are treated fairly. In the sections below,
I describe these different policy considerations and their impli-
cations for the rules governing multi-claim litigation.
A. LITIGANT CONTROL
The Rules and related doctrines attempt to provide liti-
gants a substantial amount of freedom concerning whether to
sue, the forum in which the litigation will occur, the parties
that will be involved, and the claims to be asserted. This notion
that a litigant should have substantial control over its claim has
a long history.130
This freedom, however, is not unfettered. Statutes of limi-
tations limit when one may sue. Subject matter jurisdiction,
128. Cf. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEX LITI-
GATION 25-31 (1987) [hereinafter A.L.I., PRELIMINARY STUDY] (discussing this
tension in the context of complex litigation); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COM-
PLEX LITIGATION PROJECT 25 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1989) [hereinafter A.L.I.,
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT] (same); Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in
Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 779-80 (1985) (same).
129. See G. SHREVE & P. RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 51, § 55[B] - [B][1]
(recognizing this tension).
130. See, e.g., R. MILLAR, supra note 66, at 137 (tracing the notion to Ro-
man and Germanic law as captured in the maxim invitus agere nemo cogatur
- no one is forced to act unwillingly); cf. Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 561, 565-
66 (1987) (citing the common law tradition of individual justice as the source of
antipathy toward class actions that thwart individual control).
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personal jurisdiction, venue, and change of venue doctrines all
limit forum choice.1 31 Party rules circumscribe who may be
joined and dictate who must be joined.132 Res judicata and con-
solidation limit the freedom to split claims.1 33 Nevertheless,
substantial freedom remains within these confines.
This policy of litigant control is at its zenith with plaintiffs,
who have, at least from the perspective of the Rules, complete
freedom under Rule 18(a) to determine the claims they
plead.'3 This same notion of litigant control is evident to a
more limited extent in the cross-claim provision of Rule 13(g)
and impleader provision of Rule 14, in which the claims al-
lowed, although limited, are permissive.135 Under these rules
the party chooses whether or not to raise allowable claims.
Commentators often justify the permissive nature of these
claims by arguing that parties should be free to decide whether
to sue at all,1 3 6 and if they choose to sue, to select the forum. 137
From the litigant's perspective, being able to choose whether to
sue, and if suing, being able to select the forum in which to liti-
gate, has several advantages.
Control over whether or not to sue is important because
litigation affects the primary conduct of the individuals and en-
tities involved. Whatever their present disagreements, their re-
lationship likely will deteriorate if their conflict escalates to
131. See supra note 8. See generally 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1610 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing personal
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and venue in the context of party
joinder).
132. FED. R. Crv. P. 19-20.
133. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
134. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). In contrast, a pleader must bring compul-
sory counterclaims against an opposing party, and co-parties and parties in-
volved in third-party practice are limited to raising related claims in the first
instance. See FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a), 13(g), 14.
135. See supra notes 45, 77 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-
Complaints: Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REV.
1, 35 (1970) (stating that cross-claims should be permissive rather than compul-
sory to avoid creating an incentive to sue as the only way to preserve a possi-
ble claim); cf 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 13.12[1], at 13-52
(stating that some counterclaims are permissive to preserve for the pleader the
option of deciding when the claims should be brought); 6 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1409, at 48 (same).
137. See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1431, at 237
(stating that cross-claims are permissive in part because neither party involved
has chosen the forum); cf. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, f
13.121], at 13-51 to -52 (stating that some counterclaims are permissive to pro-
tect pleader's right to choose the forum); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
supra note 8, § 1409, at 48 (same).
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litigation.1 38 Even if litigation is likely, control over the timing
of litigation may have significant strategic advantages.139
Forum choice can be extremely important.140 When more
than one forum is available, forum choice may define who can
be made parties in the litigation,141 the nature of the claims
that can be heard,142 and the witnesses who can be compelled
138. See J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RESOLVING
LEGAL DISPUTES 42 (1985); G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLE-
MENT 85-86 (1983).
139. For example, in areas in which the law is in flux, timing of a suit may
be important so that the party may act either before or after a change in the
law, whichever is to the party's advantage. See, e.g., A.L.I., PRELIMINARY
STUDY, supra note 128, at 21.
Even when the law is relatively settled, a party may wish to delay raising
a claim to see how related claims fare in ongoing litigation. For example, a
cross-claimant, for several reasons, may decide not to raise a qualifying cross-
claim, choosing instead to wait and see how the related main action develops.
This gives the party dual access to the discovery process, both in the suit in
which it is a defendant and in the subsequent litigation brought as a plaintiff.
Cf id, (stating that parties may delay filing their own actions to take advan-
tage of information discovered in related pending cases). Information the liti-
gant learns in the first proceeding may make discovery more effective in the
second. In addition, should the initial case get to trial, the trial provides the
party an opportunity to see how certain evidence is received by the judge and
jury. This, in turn, may improve the party's trial presentation in the second
action. At the least, it will influence the benchmarks for settlement in the
second proceeding. Cf. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods
of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 366, 371-74 (1986) (stating that common exposure to a case through
summary jury trial increases the information available to the parties about the
likely outcome of litigation and thus increases the chance for settlement);
Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Commit-
tee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 463, 469 (1984) (same).
140. See generally Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,
63 TuL. L. REV. 553, 556-60 (1989) (discussing some of the reasons litigants fo-
rum shop); Trangsrud, supra note 128, at 820 (discussing the impact of forum
choice in tort litigation and the individual litigant's interest in choosing the
forum).
141. Subject matter jurisdiction may limit the differing party alignments
courts can hear. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982) (stating that federal district
courts can hear cases based upon diversity of citizenship only when all of the
plaintiffs are of a different citizenship than all of the defendants). Territorial
jurisdiction concerns also will limit who can be brought before the court
against their will. When such parties cannot be joined and they are not indis-
pensable to the litigation, the litigation will go on in their absence. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). Even when subject matter and territorial jurisdiction
problems are absent, differences in standards involving the permissive joinder
of parties may affect whether particular parties can be joined in the litigation.
142. As with joinder of parties, claim joinder may be limited by subject
matter jurisdiction requirements and procedural rules of the forum. See J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 45, § 6.6 at 348.
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to attend.143 Forum choice dictates both the substantive and
procedural law the court will apply,1 " as well as the availabil-
ity of, or requirement that parties employ, various alternative
dispute resolution devices. 145 Forum choice also affects the
comparative convenience and cost of the litigation.146 In addi-
tion, differences in the judge and jurors who would hear the
case in different forums may have a significant impact on the
outcome.147 Finally, should a final judgment be entered in an
143. A witness can be compelled to attend at trial only if the individual is
within the subpoena power of the trial court. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e); see, e.g., In
re Guthrie, 733 F.2d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 1984).
144. Choice of law rules dictate the substantive law courts follow, and fo-
rums differ both on the choice of law rules to employ and how to implement
them. Different court systems also employ different procedural and eviden-
tiary rules. Even within the same court system, local rules may vary the prac-
tice from court to court. See A.L.I., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note
128, at 19, 27; Juenger, supra note 140, at 572-73; Trangsrud, supra note 128, at
821.
145. Some court systems require that parties attempt to resolve their dif-
ferences through some form of alternative dispute resolution, such as media-
tion or court-annexed arbitration, before they can proceed in litigation. See,
e.g., D. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 44-
57 (1986) (describing the differing practices in federal district courts); N. ROG-
ERS & C. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 5.1 & app. B (1989)
(reporting on the increased use of compulsory mediation in the states); Hen-
sler, Court-Annexed Arbitration, in ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR
JUDGES AND LAWYERS 27 table 1 (1987) (listing court-annexed arbitration pro-
grams in federal and state courts); Keilitz, Gallas & Hanson, State Adoption of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Where Is It Today?, 12 ST. CT. J., Spring 1988,
at 4, 6-8 (reporting that 23 states and the District of Columbia have some form
of court-annexed arbitration). Others are likely to encourage, if not require,
participation in some form of alternative dispute resolution in the course of
the litigation through devices such as summary jury trials. See generally W.
BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS
AND JUDGES 15-92 (1988) (describing the techniques available); D. PROVINE,
supra, at 68-80 (same); ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND
LAVYERS (1987) (same); Annotation, Validity and Effect of Local District
Court Rules Providing for Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures
as Pretrial Settlement Mechanisms, 86 A.L.R. FED. 211, 213-15 (1988) (collect-
ing cases).
146. All other things being equal, a plaintiff, as a general rule, will choose
the available forum that maximizes the plaintiff's convenience while putting
the defendant at the greatest disadvantage. See Juenger, supra note 140, at
555. Costs and convenience are affected by innumerable factors, such as the
physical location of the parties, counsel, witnesses, and other evidence; the
need to secure local counsel if a suit is brought in a jurisdiction in which the
principal lawyer is not admitted; and the speed with which the court resolves
cases. See A.L.I., PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 128, at 19, 27.
147. Whether because of prejudice against a party or a simple difference in
life experiences or attitudes, different judges and juries in different locales
often respond to cases quite differently. See generally M. PETERSON, CIVIL JU-
RIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND
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action, the law of the chosen forum dictates the preclusive ef-
fect the judgment will carry should subsequent litigation
arise.' 48
The choices of whether to sue and where to sue thus are of
unquestioned importance to the litigant. What is unclear is the
extent to which the system should honor these preferences at
the expense of the efficient resolution of controversies. 49
B. RESOLUTION OF ENTIRE CONTROVERSIES
Competing with the policy that a party should have sub-
stantial freedom to decide when and how to pursue a claim is
the system's interest in the efficient resolution of disputes. 50 If
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 55 (1987) (finding significant differences in jury ver-
dicts between urban and rural areas); Griffinger & McMahon, Coordinating
Parallel Litigation, 1988 LITIGATION, Winter, at 38 (describing judge shopping);
Juenger, supra note 140, at 556, 560 (discussing differences in the size of jury
awards in different locales as a reason for forum shopping); Trangsrud, supra
note 128, at 820-21 (citing studies that juries behave differently in different
locales).
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 93-95 (1971); G.
SHREVE & P. RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 51, §§ 114-16. But cf. 18 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4467-69
(1981) (arguing for much broader leeway for a second court to follow its own
preclusion doctrine rather than that of the court rendering the judgment).
149. Generally, forum shopping based on the kinds of criteria mentioned in
the text is accepted as a natural part of litigation. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984); see also Trangsrud, supra note 128, at
820-24 (recognizing the right to individual control as an important considera-
tion counterbalancing efficiency concerns); Rowe & Sibley, Beyond Diversity:
Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 17 (1986)
(citing Trangsrud). In recent discussions on the need for greater management
of complex litigation, however, several observers have questioned whether
traditional notions of individual litigation control deserve much weight. See
A.L.I., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 128, at 25 (stating that
"[t]hose who speak of an inescapable tension between the interest of the indi-
vidual litigants in procedural fairness and the interest of the judicial system in
efficient joinder of related claims may well be overstating their case"); Freer,
Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the
Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 813, 833-
37 (1989) (challenging the importance of litigant control in structuring the
lawsuit); Rosenberg, supra note 130, at 581-82 (arguing that forum choice in-
volves "[an] opportunistic manipulation of judicial processes to secure a sys-
tematically biased or myopic forum [which] hardly comports with notions of
even-handed fairness" and that justice does not require that "the public subsi-
dize [a litigant's] personal preference for separate lawsuits to relitigate com-
mon questions"); Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions, Going, Going, Gone?, 98
F.R.D. 323, 329 (1983) (terming the "right" of individual plaintiffs to "control
their own case" as "totally specious").
150. Counterclaims, cross-claims, impleader, and permissive claim joinder
all are premised on the goal of eliminating circuity of actions and avoiding
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the parties resolve all of their claims in one proceeding rather
than several, it usually saves time and expense for the court,
the parties, and the witnesses involved.151 Beyond the immedi-
ate effect on the participants, consolidation frees up judicial re-
sources for other litigation. 52 Further, resolving interrelated
claims in one proceeding increases the opportunity for consis-
tent results.15 3 From a broader perspective, consolidation en-
courages the parties to bring a dispute to a close so they can get
on with their lives.154
The desire to resolve entire controversies in one proceed-
ing is at the core of the compulsory counterclaim provision in
Rule 13(a). That Rule, with limited exceptions, requires parties
to raise any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. 55 If a
compulsory counterclaim is not raised, it is waived.' 56
As discussed below, one might take this policy further and
require all parties of whatever status to raise all claims they
have arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. 57
Although the Rules do not explicitly require plaintiffs to do
this, the doctrine of res judicata in large measure already
multiple litigation. See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8,
§ 1403, at 15 (Rule 13 in general), § 1409, at 46 (counterclaims), § 1431, at 229
(cross-claims), § 1442, at 289-90 (impleader), § 1458, at 446 (claims between
plaintiffs and third-party defendants); cf. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, supra note 8, § 1582, at 521 (permissive claim joinder).
151. See A.L.I., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 128, at 20-24;
Freer, supra note 149, at 814; Rowe & Sibley, supra note 149, at 15-16.
152. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 149, at 813; McCoid, A Single Package for
Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 707 (1976); cf. Rosenberg, supra
note 130, at 564 (stating that increase in time and expense involved in resolv-
ing particular controversy adds to time and expense of resolving other cases,
given the courts' limited resources).
153. See A.L.., PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 128, at 29; A.L.I. COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 128, at 21; Freer, supra note 149, at 834; Rowe
& Sibley, supra note 149, at 15; see also McCoid, supra note 152, at 707 (ac-
knowledging this concern, but suggesting it might be "overrated"); cf. 3
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 14.04, at 14-26 (articulating ra-
tionale with respect to impleader).
154. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 149, at 814. The joinder rules, like those of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, seek to encourage a single resolution of re-
lated issues. Because of this, the policies underlying them substantially over-
lap. See G. SHREVE & P. RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 51, § 55[B][1], at 219 n.4.
See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 148, § 4403, at
11-22 (articulating the policies underlying the preclusion doctrines).
155. FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974).
157. See infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
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does.158 To avoid waiver of a right to relief, res judicata rules
require a party raising a claim to join together "all rights of the
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all
or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transac-
tions, out of which the action arose."' 59 Whether res judicata
alone is sufficient to achieve the compulsory joinder of plain-
tiffs' interrelated causes of action is an open question, 60 but at
least the res judicata rules reflect a rough parallel in treatment
between a claimant and one responding to a claim.161
158. See, e.g., 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, % 18.04(1], at
18-14 (noting that despite the rule of permissive joinder, "where only one
cause of action is actually involved the [res judicata] rule against splitting a
cause of action will prevent a second cause of action"); 6A C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1582, at 525 (same).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982). Other less ex-
pansive definitions of a claim are recognized in federal and state courts, but
the trend appears to be toward a transactional approach. See 1B J. MOORE, J.
LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE % 0.410[1], at 355-59 (2d ed.
1988); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 148, § 4407, at 55, 59,
62; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment a (1982); Shreve,
Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1212-13, 1217
(1986).
160. Res judicata may be inadequate in two ways. First, reliance on the
often misunderstood doctrine of res judicata as a form of compulsory joinder
for plaintiffs may leave the plaintiff with insufficient notice of what must be
plead in the initial litigation. This lack of notice creates a problem because the
plaintiff may be precluded from raising a claim in subsequent litigation. Cf.
MICH. CT. R. 2.203(A)(2) (requiring, in response to this concern, that any ob-
jection for a claimant's failure to raise all transactionally related claims
against an opposing party in one action must be raised in that action or it is
waived and "the judgment shall only merge the claims actually litigated"). See
also MICH. GEN. CT. R. 203 committee comment (1963) (describing as the pur-
pose of the predecessor version of the current Michigan provision protection
against the inadvertent loss of a claim through claim preclusion); Blume, The
Scope of a Cause of Action - Elimination of the Splitting Trap, 38 MICH. ST.
B.J. 10, 10-13 (Dec. 1959) (lauding the then proposed Michigan provision as
eliminating "one of our most vicious procedural traps").
Second, to the extent the res judicata standards to be applied are not as
expansive as the transactional definition of a claim - the most expansive defi-
nition to date - plaintiffs still have less of a joinder requirement than defend-
ants, an imbalance that is difficult to justify. See 1B J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T.
CURRIER, supra note 159, f 0.401[1], at 361; see also Ferriell, Res Judicata in
Ohio: Preclusion of Causes of Action or Claims?, 10 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 241, 246-
47 (1983) (identifying this problem under Ohio law); Friedenthal, supra note
136, at 37 (identifying this problem under California law).
161. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 45, § 14.4, at 627
(stating that "[t]he same-transaction test for res judicata is pragmatically
equivalent to a compulsory joinder rule ... imposing a similar compulsion
upon the plaintiff [as the compulsory counterclaim rule imposes on defend-
ants, thus] ... balancing the relative positions of plaintiffs and defendants").
One might ask why sued parties need be compelled to act by rule, rather
than simply relying on res judicata to encourage the pleading or waiver of
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Although res judicata and the compulsory counterclaim
rule together trump the policy of litigant freedom of choice, by
respectively requiring claimants and those confronting opposing
parties to plead related claims in one action, co-party claims re-
lated to the litigation and Rule 14 claims are treated differ-
ently. The Rules allow, but do not require, parties to raise
these claims. 162 In those contexts, freedom of choice outweighs
efficiency concerns.
When a litigant files a claim against another, the resulting
relationship by definition has deteriorated. Res judicata and
the compulsory counterclaim rule in essence provide that, if
parties are joined in litigation against each other, they should
be required to fight the entire battle at one time. Parties are
not required to litigate any matter, but they cannot hold back
some related claims to fight on a different front. When parties
are not yet fighting each other in court, however, different poli-
cies come into play. Under these circumstances, the parties are
more likely to decide never to sue each other. Thus, a compul-
sory pleading rule for co-party and impleader claims would
force parties to either enter into antagonistic relationships not
yet established or waive their nonasserted claims. 163 Further, if
parties were compelled to file claims against each other in or-
der to preserve them, it often would undercut a cooperative
strategy co-parties might take against a common claimant. 164
their claims. Res judicata, however, only applies to claims that are pleaded,
except in a very limited set of circumstances in which "[t]he relationship be-
tween the counterclaim and the plaintiff's claim is such that successful prose-
cution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or would impair
rights established in the initial action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 22(2)(b) (1982). Thus, absent the compulsion of the counterclaim
rule, a defendant would not be required to raise a related claim. Nevertheless,
the first litigation may resolve issues central to the defendant's claim and thus
as a practical matter preclude its assertion in subsequent litigation through the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 3019(a)
practice commentary C3019:2. See also 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 12, T 13.12[1], at 13-51 (acknowledging but rejecting the argument that the
compulsory counterclaim is unnecessary because of the operation of res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel).
162. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g), 14. Of course, if a party decides to bring a
cross-claim or Rule 14 impleader claim, the doctrine of res judicata requires
the party to bring the entire claim at one time or risk preclusion. See supra
notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
163. See Friedenthal, supra note 136, at 35.
164. See id. But see Win. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 150 N.J.
Super. 277, 292-97, 375 A.2d 675, 680-84 (App. Div.) (requiring pleading of re-
lated claims by co-parties under New Jersey's "entire controversy doctrine,"
and rejecting the argument that co-parties should be allowed to withhold
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For all these reasons, the Rules allow pleading of related claims
in cross-claims and third-party practice, to achieve the effi-
ciency of litigating a whole controversy in one action. The
Rules do not make such pleading compulsory, however, in or-
der to avoid creating an incentive for litigation that otherwise
might never arise. 65
C. THE PROPRIETARY VIEW OF LITIGATION
Subject to the pressure of the competing concerns related
above, one may take a proprietary view of litigation. A plaintiff
initiates a lawsuit to vindicate certain rights protected by law.
To the extent other parties raise claims within the litigation,
the lawsuit becomes more cumbersome and the plaintiff's op-
portunity to use the system effectively for vindication of its
claims decreases. The Rules thus are structured to reduce the
instances in which the plaintiff will become a bystander while
collateral claims of others are litigated.
As mentioned above, the Rules give a plaintiff a great deal
of freedom in initially structuring the litigation.166 To allow
the plaintiff unilateral control of the litigation, however, might
unfairly disadvantage other parties or the system as a whole.
Thus, the Rules allow a modification of the plaintiff's choices
when unfairness would occur. In the context of multi-claim lit-
igation, when a plaintiff sues a defendant, the plaintiff loses the
right to limit its opponent's claims. 16 7 It would be unfair to al-
low the plaintiff to choose the claims pursued and then limit
the defendant's response. When the plaintiff picks a fight, the
defendant is free to fight back.
Cross-claims between co-defendants and claims between
defendants and third-parties, however, do not involve the plain-
tiff directly. Litigating these claims can complicate and delay
the plaintiff's suit.168 Out of concern for fairness to the par-
claims in order "to present a 'united front'" against adverse claimants), certif.
denied, 75 N.J. 528, 384 A.2d 507 (1977).
165. But cf. Freer, supra note 149, at 823 n.76 (stating that "there appears
to be no reason for not making cross-claims compulsory").
166. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
167. See FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a), (b).
168. Even when qualifying cross-claims are involved, the presence of
such claims may force the plaintiff's action to take a back seat. See, e.g.,
Friedenthal, Whom to Sue - Multiple Defendants, in 5 AM. JURIS. TRIALS § 8,
at 13 (1966) (warning plaintiffs that in filing suits against multiple defendants,
they should be aware that the defendants might cross-claim and make those
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ties,1 69 and overall efficiency,170 however, the Rules allow
pleading of related claims not involving the plaintiff. 71 Foster-
ing fairness and allowing resolution of whole controversies sim-
ply outweighs the concern that the plaintiff's chance for
recovery is made more difficult. Further, if the plaintiff is se-
verely harmed by the inclusion of these other claims in the liti-
gation, the court may order severance or a separate trial.17 2
Claims unrelated to the litigation, however, cannot be raised
through cross-claims or impleader until a qualifying claim is
pleaded.173 The additional efficiency of raising unrelated claims
in the already filed action,174 is simply insufficient to outweigh
the concern for the plaintiff's proprietary interest in its own
claims the "focus of the lawsuit," diminishing the importance of the plaintiff's
claim, and resulting in a less favorable verdict for the plaintiff).
Aside from delay and confusion, litigation of these claims may even preju-
dice the plaintiff's case on the merits. For example, in a suit by an injured
party against an employer for injuries caused by an employee, the employer
often will seek to implead the employee. It does so to alert the jury that the
employee ultimately may be responsible for any judgment, in the hope that
this will arouse jury sympathy and lead to a smaller damage award than had
the employer been in the suit alone. Because of this potential for prejudice,
impleader claims such as these often are severed. See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1443, at 307-08. In fact, in some systems the plain-
tiff retains an absolute right, upon request, to have the claims adjudicated in
separate trials. See, e.g., OH. R. Civ. P. 14(A) (stating that "[i]f the third-party
defendant is an employee, agent, or servant of the third-party plaintiff, the
court shall order a separate trial upon the motion of any plaintiff").
169. Cf 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 14.04, at 14-26 (cit-
ing the serious handicap a defendant would face if forced to pursue its claim
for liability over only after judgment was entered against it); 6 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1442, at 290-91 (same).
170. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
171. The relationship required between the main action and a cross-claim
or an impleader claim differ. See supra note 37 and text accompanying supra
note 95. Impleader claims are more limited, perhaps because bringing a new
party into the proceeding is more burdensome than adding claims among those
already parties, and thus is more disruptive of the plaintiff's interest in resolv-
ing her own claims. But cf FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h) (allowing a party to bring in
an outside party as a co-defendant to a cross-claim).
172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(i) (providing for separate trials for cross-
claims); FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a) (allowing severance or separate trial for third-
party claims); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (providing for separate trial "in further-
ance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be con-
ducive to expedition and economy").
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g), 14. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying
text.
174. Even the joinder of unrelated actions may allow cost savings in filing
fees, service of process, and coordinated discovery. See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra




Falling in between these situations are claims between the
plaintiff and the third-party defendant. Unlike claims between
the plaintiff and the original defendant, these claims are not an
outgrowth of the litigation unit the plaintiff originally chose.
On the other hand, these claims at least involve the plaintiff di-
rectly, while cross-claims and impleader claims do not.'7 6 In
deference to the plaintiff's right to structure the lawsuit ini-
tially and thereby limit the scope of the retaliatory effort it is
likely to face, the Rules limit the third-party defendant's claims
against the plaintiff to those arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim between the
plaintiff and the original defendant.' 7" The Rules place the
same restriction on the plaintiff's claims against the third-party
defendant,178 but for a different reason. Had the plaintiff
sought to sue the original defendant and the third-party de-
fendant in the initial action as co-defendants, the plaintiff
would have been required under Rule 20 to assert against each
of them at least one claim that arose out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence and shared a common question of law or
fact.179 The limitation in Rule 14 approximates that restriction
and ensures that the plaintiff cannot do indirectly what would
be prohibited directly by Rule 20.180 The Rules thus incorpo-
175. See, e.g., McCormick v. Mays, 124 F.R.D. 164, 167-68 (S.D. Ohio 1988);
see also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 1431, at 237 (stat-
ing that cross-claims are limited to related claims to protect the plaintiff from
becoming a mere bystander to the litigation). Although some efficiency sav-
ings are possible from the common litigation of related and unrelated claims,
they are likely to be small, and may be outweighed by the additional complex-
ity that litigation of unrelated claims would bring to the proceeding. Cf id-
(discussing concern for complexity).
176. Going back to the hypothetical set forth in the beginning of the Arti-
cle, A, who contracted for the building of an office building, chose to file suit
only against the general contractor [B] and a particular subcontractor [C]. As-
sume C in turn brought in D, a supplier, for indemnification or contribution.
At this point A may now assert a claim against D so long as the claim is tran-
sactionally related to the initial claims A brought against C, the party that imr-
pleaded D. For example, A might now assert a claim against D for breach of a
supply contract that in turn contributed to the breaches by C, the subcontrac-
tor, being sued upon in A's initial complaint. See generally Brailsford, supra
note 31, § 5.1-.20 (describing claims available to owners against material
suppliers).
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
178. Id-
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
180. Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane attribute this restriction to the
"policy of preventing the litigation from expanding to include unrelated claims
that might unduly complicate the action." 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
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rate the policy of protecting the plaintiff's proprietary interest
in the litigation by requiring claims either to be brought by the
original plaintiff or defendant or to be transactionally related
thereto.
D. EQUAL OWNERSHIP OF THE FORUM
The limits of the proprietary view become apparent upon
consideration of the effect of Rule 18(a). As discussed earlier,
cross-claims and impleader claims initially are limited to claims
that arise out of the original litigation.1 8 ' This follows from the
belief that the plaintiff has some right to structure the suit and
assure that his or her controversy, and claims related to it, be-
come the center of the litigation. 8 2 The Rules give defendants
broader latitude to raise claims against the plaintiff, but only
because it seems unfair to restrict the defendant's actions in
head-to-head combat with the plaintiff.'8 3 Yet, this basic re-
striction on claims not directly involving the plaintiff falls by
the wayside once the defendant asserts a qualifying claim. Rule
18(a) then allows the cross-claimant or the third-party plaintiff
to assert any claim.'8 4
At first blush, none of the justifications courts and com-
mentators have asserted for this practice seem strong. Rule
18(a)'s broad provision for the joinder of claims usually is sup-
ported by the notion that "no inconvenience can result from
joinder of any two or more matters in the pleadings, but only
from trying two or more matters together which have little or
nothing in common."'18 5 In other words, if any unfairness arises
simply try the claims separately. Although this is a principled
philosophy, it supports unlimited claim joinder, not the require-
ment that a party seeking to assert a cross-claim or third-party
claim first must plead a qualifying claim before non-qualifying
claims can follow. 186
KANE, supra note 8, § 1459, at 449. I suspect this policy is behind the restric-
tions on permissive party joinder in Rule 20 as well.
181. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
182. See generally supra Part III. D. (discussing proprietary interest of
plaintiff as a policy supporting limitation of certain claims not central to the
litigation).
183. See supra text accompanying note 167.
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a); see supra note 112-14 and accompanying text.
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 18 advisory committee's note (1966) (quoting Sunder-
land, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L. REv. 5, 13 (1938)).
186. Indeed, Professor Kaplan, advisory committee reporter for the 1966
amendments to Rule 18, admits as much, but supports the more limited incre-
mental increase in claim joinder accomplished through the 1966 amendment to
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A second rationale might be one of litigant equality. Liti-
gants should be treated equally, so co-defendants and third-
party plaintiffs should be as free as plaintiffs to assert claims.
Again, this is a justifiable position, but it militates in favor of
unqualified joinder of claims, not unqualified joinder only after
passing a threshold test.
Perhaps Rule 18(a) is really a rough accommodation of
competing interests. Until the co-defendant or third-party
plaintiff asserts a qualifying claim, protection of the plaintiff's
proprietary interest in the litigation deserves deference. Once
such a claim has been raised, however, the claimant voluntarily
has accepted the forum as her own and in so doing has as much
right to use the forum to its fullest as does the plaintiff. At
that point, equality of treatment trumps the plaintiff's proprie-
tary interest.
Further, to do otherwise would create a system of perverse
incentives. A co-defendant or a third-party plaintiff would be
faced with the choice either of litigating the related claim in
the first action and the unrelated claim in a separate action, or
waiting to raise both claims in a separate proceeding in which
both claims could be joined. Given that a second suit would be
required if joinder were not allowed in the first action, the at-
tractiveness of asserting the related claims in a second suit
might undercut the efficiency the cross-claim and impleader
rules otherwise are trying to foster.1 8 7
E. SOME FURTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF How THE POLICY
COMPROMISES WORK
Yet to be addressed are the way the Rules provide for
shifting status once a party is sued, and the treatment the
Rules accord claims between co-defendants of the third-party
plaintiff and the third-party defendant. The unique interaction
of the policies already discussed in these contexts deserves
mention.
1. Shifting Status
At first blush the treatment of the sued co-defendant
Rule 18(a) by noting "[R]ulemakers must not march too far ahead of the
parade." Kaplan, supra note 126, at 597-99. Dean Charles Clark, a member of
the initial advisory committee for the Federal Rules, has commented that com-
plete freedom of joinder is consistent with the philosophy underlying the join-
der rules. See Cleveland Institute, supra note 56, at 261-62.
187. See Friedenthal, supra note 136, at 33-34.
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under the Rules seems strange. Why set up special rules for co-
defendants limiting the claims they can bring and making their
pleading discretionary rather than mandatory, only to have
those limitations cease and their status shift to that of opposing
parties once one defendant files suit against the other? A simi-
lar question exists with regard to Rule 14 claims.
.To the extent the Rules seek to protect the plaintiff from
becoming a bystander in her own litigation, the shift makes no
sense. Subjecting the sued co-party to the compulsory counter-
claim rule and allowing that co-party to sue on unrelated
claims without first asserting a qualifying claim can only foster
litigation in which the plaintiff is not directly involved. Never-
theless, the efficiency and fairness concerns that mandate coun-
terclaim treatment for the claims of the defendant against the
original plaintiff apply to the claims of the sued co-party as
well. 8 8 Apparently the drafters of the Rules felt these effi-
ciency and fairness concerns are of sufficient moment to out-
weigh the potential harm to the plaintiff's interests and the
loss of freedom of choice encountered by the sued co-party.
2. Claims Between Co-Defendants of the Third-Party
Plaintiff and the Third-Party Defendant
As previously mentioned, the Rules make no specific provi-
sion for claims between the co-defendant of the third-party
plaintiff and the third-party defendant.189 Nevertheless, most
courts try to find a procedural vehicle to hear such claims, usu-
ally treating them under the cross-claim, impleader, or Rule
13(h) provisions. 90
Under any of these theories, the claims allowed are permis-
sive, thus preserving litigant control over the assertion of
claims. Allowing pleading of claims between these parties fur-
thers the policy goal of resolving entire controversies in a single
proceeding. Moreover, not allowing any claims between the co-
defendant of the third-party plaintiff and the third-party de-
fendant would create procedural inequality between the origi-
nal co-defendants. Assuming each had an impleader claim
against the same third party, the party that first asserted its
claim would divest the other of the opportunity to raise its im-
188. It is primarily the efficiency concern that underlies compulsory coun-
terclaim requirements, and the fairness concern that militates in favor of per-
missive counterclaim rules.
189. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
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pleader claim in the proceeding.1 91 Not only would this preju-
dice the slower party for no apparent reason, it also would
create an unwarranted incentive for a party to bring impleader
claims, and to do so quickly, to preserve its claims and perhaps
disadvantage another litigant.192
Among the different approaches courts take to allow par-
ties to assert claims in this setting, the impleader approach
seems best for two reasons. First, impleader provides equality
of treatment among the original co-defendants. Regardless of
who acts first, each retains the right to seek liability over from
the third-party defendant, and no more, as a qualifying claim.
Second, impleader generates less collateral litigation than
cross-claim treatment because impleader claims are limited to
claims for liability over as a threshold requirement, while cross-
claim rules require only that claims have a transactional rela-
tionship to the main litigation.19 3
F. SUMMARY
Given the policy that litigants should have the freedom to
structure their own litigation, plaintiffs are given substantial
freedom in determining the claims to bring in one action. Be-
cause of the systemic need to resolve entire controversies
among adversaries, defendants are required to raise their tran-
sactionally related claims as compulsory counterclaims. No-
tions of fairness, equality of treatment, and efficiency also allow
defendants to raise unrelated claims as permissive counter-
claims. As to matters collateral to the plaintiff's original
claims, deference to the plaintiff's proprietary stake in the liti-
gation initially limits the claims that can be brought. Efficiency
and fairness notions, however, command that other parties in
the litigation be allowed, although not required, to raise collat-
eral claims on matters sufficiently related to the litigation.
191. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
192. See Georgia Ports Auth. v. Construzioni Meccaniche Industriali Ge-
novesi, S.P.A., 119 F.R.D. 693, 695 (S.D. Ga. 1988); supra note 98. For example,
in the hypothetical posed in the beginning of the article, A, the builder of an
office building, sues B, the general contractor, and C, a subcontractor for
breach of contract. Either B or C may have a contractual right of indemnifica-
tion or a right of contribution against D, a supplier that failed to meet its sup-
ply obligations contributing to the problems arising in the completion of the
building. See generally Bowers, supra note 29, § 5.3, at 35-36 (discussing im-
pleading of suppliers by contractors). Allowing the party that acts first to cut
off the right of the other to assert its rights to indemnification or contribution
seems unwarranted.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20, 27 & 37.
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Once collateral disputants have embraced the forum by raising
a discretionary claim and have entered into an adversarial rela-
tionship, they are allowed and required to use the proceeding as
fully as if they had initiated it.
IV. POSSIBLE REFORMS
As presently written, the Federal Rules covering multi-
claim litigation at best lack clarity and at worst may materially
mislead litigants about their rights and responsibilities. At a
minimum, the Rules should be amended to clarify these
ambiguities.
More broadly, the Rules reflect an accommodation of con-
flicting policies that may not be optimal. Although the federal
model is the predominant one in the states,194 it by no means
constitutes the exclusive approach. A review of alternative ap-
proaches provides a framework for a more critical assessment
of the federal scheme.
A. LANGUAGE REFORM - PERFECTING TIE STATUS QUO
Assuming agreement with the policy compromises implicit
in the current Rules, amendment to the Rules still is desirable
to clarify existing ambiguities. From this perspective, the ma-
jor problem with the Rules today is that they are likely to mis-
lead litigants about their rights and duties in multiple claim
litigation.195
The Rules at present suffer from four major deficiencies. 196
194. See supra note 1.
195. This part of the Article suggests changes in the language of the multi-
claim rules that will make them more clear and direct. Another problem that
arises in this area, however, is the unarticulated influence of res judicata and
collateral estoppel on the pleading process. Regardless of the requirements of
the procedural rules, the preclusion doctrines may, as a practical matter, bar
parties from litigating a claim not asserted in the first action. See supra text
accompanying notes 158-61. Reforming the multi-claim rules to provide ex-
plicit notice of their interaction with the preclusion doctrines is discussed in-
fra text accompanying note 219; supra text accompanying note 160.
196. In addition to the problems discussed in the text, the multi-claim rules
suffer from some less significant ambiguities as well. For example, Rule 18 au-
thorizes joinder of claims with respect to "an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim," but does not explicitly mention claims be-
tween the original plaintiff and the third-party defendant. FED. R. Civ. P.
18(a). Perhaps such claims are "third-party claims" because they are author-
ized under the "Third Party Practice" rule (Rule 14), but it is not completely
clear. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
Further, Rule 18(a) provides that "[a] party asserting a claim to relief as
•.. [a] cross-claim ... may join ... as many claims... as the party has against
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First, many litigants are likely to be unaware, without the court
informing them, 97 that even if they initially are outside the
purview of the counterclaim rules, their status shifts and they
become subject to those rules after a claim has been asserted
against them.1 98 Second, the Rules inadvertantly limit the
scope of impleader practice.199 Third, the Rules make no provi-
sion for claims between co-defendants of the third-party plain-
tiff and the third-party defendant.200 Finally, co-parties and
third-party claimants may not know that although Rules 13(g)
and 14 limit the claims they may raise, Rule 18(a) allows them
to bring nonqualifying claims once a qualifying claim is as-
serted.201 These problems could be solved in a number of ways.
1. The Problem of Shifting Status
Several approaches to the problem of shifting status are
available. One approach is to include a definition of the phrase
"opposing party" within the Rules. Such a provision might
read:
Opposing party - Any party asserting a claim, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, becomes an op-
posing party to the party sued. In making a response, the party sued
is subject to the counterclaim provisions of Rule 13.202
Because the Federal Rules do not include a definitional section,
this approach, while simple and direct, may be too different in
form for adoption.20 3
an opposing party." FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Given that the law distinguishes be-
tween co-parties, who are to bring cross-claims, and opposing parties, against
whom counterclaims are brought, the language appears confusing. Montana
attempts to correct this by adding the words "or coparty" to the end of the
Rule. MONT. R. CIv. P. 18(a) advisory committee's note (1967).
197. Cf. Mohr v. State Bank, 241 Kan. 42, 51, 734 P.2d 1071, 1079 (1987) (in-
forming the claimant that its claim was a compulsory counterclaim in a pend-
ing action, and advising the claimant to amend its answer in the first litigation
and to assert the claim in that proceeding).
198. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
202. As presently written, the counterclaim rules speak of the counter-
claimant as "the pleader" and the person against whom the counterclaim is as-
serted as an "opposing party." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b). The definition
suggested in this Article follows this approach. Alternatively, one might de-
fine a party sued as an "opposing party" to the original claimant and then re-
write the counterclaim rules to govern the pleading of counterclaims by
opposing parties against ones who have asserted a claim against them.
203. This somewhat overstates the case. In setting forth the circumstances
in which particular rules operate, the drafters at times do define terms indi-
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An alternative approach is to alter the language of Rules
13(g) and 14. Three alternative suggestions for changes in Rule
13(g) are provided below. Analogous changes could be made to
Rule 14 as well.20 4
One approach is to add the following sentence at the end of
current rule 13(g):
Once a cross-claim has been pleaded against a co-party, the cross-
claimant becomes an opposing party and the responding party is sub-
ject to the counterclaim provisions of Rule 13.
As another formulation, one might add:
The party against whom a cross-claim is asserted must plead as a
counterclaim any right to relief that party has against the cross-claim-
ant that arises from the same transaction or occurrence.
20 5
Alternatively, the language of Rule 14 concerning third-party
defendants could be imported into Rule 13. Under this ap-
proach the following sentence would be added to the end of
current Rule 13(g):
The co-party served with the cross-claim shall make any defenses to
the cross-claim as provided in Rule 12 and any counterclaims against
the cross-laimant and cross-claims against any other co-parties as
provided in Rule 13.
Any of these alternatives has several advantages over the
definitional proposal noted above. Each is in keeping with the
present format of the Rules. In addition, each would be located
directly in the provision dealing with cross-claims and co-par-
ties. It thus is more likely that a co-party subject to a cross-
claim will find this rule and be alerted to the shift in status.
Among the proposed alternatives, the latter has the advan-
tage of using language familiar to practitioners and courts. On
the other hand, it strikes me as overkill, as it does in its present
rectly. Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) (defining persons to be joined if feasible
through the criteria set forth).
204. In discussing claims that can be raised by the third-party defendant,
Rule 14 specifies that the third-party defendant shall assert counterclaims in
response to claims by either the original plaintiff or the third-party plaintiff as
provided in Rule 13. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The Rule, however, does not dis-
cuss what provisions govern an original plaintiff's or third-party plaintiff's
claim made in response to a claim raised by the third-party defendant. The
specific reference to Rule 13 counterclaims when the third-party defendant is
sued, and the silence when claims are raised against the original plaintiff or
the third-party plaintiff, creates unnecessary ambiguity. See Developments,
supra note 79, at 975.
205. Cf. ALA. R. Civ. P. 13 committee comments (setting forth this provi-
sion in essentially the same language). Although Alabama put this language
in the committee comments accompanying Rule 13, it is better placed in the
text of the rule itself because a lawyer may not check the advisory committee
notes, assuming the text to be clear.
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Rule 14 usage as well. The first two suggestions seem simpler,
more direct, and better address the area in which confusion
most likely arises.
2. Claims Between Co-defendants of the Third-Party Plaintiff
and the Third-Party Defendant, and the Proper
Scope of Impleader
Given that courts take different procedural approaches to
claims between co-defendants of the third-party plaintiff and
the third-party defendant,206 the necessary revision will depend
on the court's approach.2 07 Under the approach suggested here,
which is to treat the relationship as one of impleader, Rule 14
might be amended to state in part:
[A] defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons
and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the original
action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff.
Adding the italicized term captures the reading advocated by
the courts adopting the impleader approach.208 It suffers, how-
ever, in two respects. First, it speaks of service of a summons,
which is necessary for a non-party, but unnecessary for a party
already in the proceeding. Although it is possible to write the
Rule to eliminate that misstatement, it would make the Rule
awkward. Second, and more importantly, even with this
amendment the Rule still fails to reach what I suspect is its in-
tended goal - to freely allow impleader for anyone in the liti-
gation who is subject to a claim.
As mentioned earlier, the present Rules do not allow
pleaders to raise contingent claims against opposing parties,20 9
nor do they explicitly provide for such claims by a party subject
to a cross-claim.210 To reach this latter goal, Rule 13(g) could
be amended to eliminate its provision for liability over, leaving
206. See supra text accompanying notes 88-108.
207. For example, although I do not advocate this approach, some authori-
ties treat the co-defendant of the third-party plaintiff and the third-party de-
fendant relationship as that of co-parties. See supra notes 88-89 and
accompanying text. To reflect this under the Rules, future drafters might add
a definitional section that defines co-parties to include this relationship. Alter-
natively, Rule 14 could spell out expressly the permissible claims between
these parties, much as it does for the claims between the original plaintiff and
the third-party defendant.
208. See, e.g., Malaspina v. Farah Mfg. Co., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
129, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
209. See supra note 25.
210. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Rule 14 as the sole source of this authority. Rule 14 then would
be rewritten to read:
[A] defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may assert a claim
against a party, or cause a summons and complaint to be served upon
a person not a party to the action, alleging that the party is or may be
liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of a claim asserted in
the action against the third-party plaintiff.
This revision would eliminate all barriers to impleader practice
and allow use of Rule 14 by any party against whom a claim for
relief has been asserted. It would eliminate the problem caused
by the Rule's current interpretation, proscribing an opposing
party from raising a contingent claim. It would provide express
authorization for impleader for a party subject to a cross-
claim.211 Finally, it would provide a vehicle for co-defendants
of the third-party plaintiff to assert impleader claims against
the third-party defendant.21 2 This latter approach best reflects
the Rule's intent.
3. Joinder of Non-Qualifying Claims to Qualifying Ones
Two basic approaches, or a combination of them, would
alert co-parties and third-parties that once they raise a qualify-
ing claim, they then are free to join non-qualifying claims. One
approach is to add a sentence to Rule 18(a) to that effect. For
example:
Additional claims may be joined to a proper cross-claim or third-party
claim, even if the additional claims would not qualify as proper cross-
claims or third-party claims if sued upon alone.
Alternatively, revisors could add similar language to the
cross-claim or third-party practice rules. For example, one
might add the following to Rule 13(g):
Additional claims may be joined to a proper cross-claim even if the
211. Under Rule 14, impleader is authorized expressly for defendants in re-
sponse to plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs in response to defendants' claims, and
third-party defendants in response to third-party plaintiffs' claims. In each of
these situations the claim involves the plaintiff in some manner. Either the
plaintiff itself is seeking impleader, or other parties are seeking to pass along
liability flowing from the plaintiff's initial claim. Allowing a co-party to use
impleader in response to a cross-claim, in contrast, does not involve the plain-
tiff or the plaintiff's claim at all. If our only goal were to protect the plain-
tiff's proprietary interest in the lawsuit, these claims would not be allowed. I
believe, however, that the same fairness and efficiency concerns that allow im-
pleader in the first place still should win out here, even though these im-
pleader claims are somewhat further from the plaintiff's interests.
212. As a stylistic matter, this revision also would eliminate the need for
separate provisions authorizing impleader by the third-party defendant and
the plaintiff. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a), (b).
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additional claims would not qualify as proper cross-claims if sued
upon alone.
2 1 3
As a hybrid, revisors could amend Rule 18(a) as indicated
above and then add a cross-reference to Rule 18 in both the
cross-claim and third-party practice rules. The addition to Rule
13(g) might read:
The cross-claimant may raise multiple claims in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 18(a).
The first option, amending Rule 18(a), has the advantage of
maintaining Rule 18(a) as central authority for multiple claim
assertion by a party. In whatever context the question of
whether a party can join claims together arises, Rule 18 would
provide an answer. The problem with this approach is that a
co-party may look to Rule 13(g), see the limitation on allowable
claims, and never think that another rule might trump the ap-
parent limitation. Therefore, treating the matter in the cross-
claim rule itself is more likely to alert the party. The hybrid
solution seeks to meet both concerns. The cross-reference
alerts the litigant that Rule 18 also should be consulted, while
Rule 18(a) retains its role as the single source of authority for
multi-claim litigation.
B. STRUCTURAL REFORM - CHANGING THE POLICY MIX
Beyond amending the language of the Federal Rules to
avoid present ambiguities, it may be appropriate to re-think the
fundamental policy compromises inherent in the current struc-
ture. Out of such a re-assessment, a consensus may emerge for
amendment of the multi-party rules to reflect a different policy
mix. One place to begin this re-assessment is by looking at the
procedural approaches taken in the states.
Despite the dominance of the Federal Rules model for
multi-claim litigation,21 4 significant variations exist among the
states. These alternatives can be grouped into four major cate-
gories, each reflecting a different emphasis among the previ-
ously identified polices at work in the multi-claim context.
213. Cf FLA. R. CiV. P. 1.180(a) (providing that in addition to a claim for
impleader, the original defendant "may also assert any other claim that arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim"); N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:8-1 (providing a third-party practice rule with
similar language).
214. See supra note 1.
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1. Maximizing Litigant Control
The procedural rules in some states place a premium on
providing litigants freedom to determine whether or not to
bring a claim. These states eschew compulsory rules of any
kind.215
Because in many instances the parties themselves will
want the efficiency that comes with the single litigation of a re-
lated controversy, they often will assert claims voluntarily that
would be compulsory in other states or in the federal system.216
In addition, pressure to bring related claims arises indepen-
dently of state rules of civil procedure, from the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel.217
States with completely permissive claim rules depend on
preclusion to encourage efficient joinder of claims. This ap-
proach seems flawed. To the extent the preclusion doctrines
really compel joinder of related claims as a practical matter,2 18
215. The one compulsory claim under the Federal Rules is the compulsory
counterclaim; the rest are permissive. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). In a number
of states, however, even a transactionally related counterclaim is permissive.
See CONN. R. CT. § 116; ILL. CODE CiV. P. § 2-608; LA. CODE CIV. P. ANN. art.
1037; MD. R. Civ. P. 2-331(a); MICH. R. CT. 2.203(C); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-812,
25-814 (1985); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 3019(a); OR. R. Civ. P. ANN. 22 A.(1);
R. VA. Sup. CT., 2:13, 3:8; Wis. CT. R. AND PROC. § 802.07(1).
216. Cf. Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure:
Chapters 801 to 803, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 58-59 (1976) (stating that the commit-
tee considering amendments to the Wisconsin procedural rules decided not to
adopt a compulsory counterclaim provision in part because "the absence of a
compulsory counterclaim rule [had] not caused any significant problem in Wis-
consin practice").
217. Res judicata requires a claimant to bring an entire "claim" at one
time, in whatever manner the unit "claim" is defined by the law of the partic-
ular state. See supra note 159. The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes lit-
igants, whether or not claimants themselves, from relitigating issues actually
litigated, determined, and essential to the first action. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Cf. Clausen & Lowe, supra note 216, at
58-59 (explaining that Wisconsin decided not to adopt a compulsory counter-
claim rule in part because "the purpose of compulsory counterclaims . . . is
promoted in Wisconsin law by the rules of collateral estoppel"). See also N.Y.
CiV. PRAC. L. & R. § 3019(a) practice commentary C3019:2 (noting that under
New York Civil Practice all counterclaims are permissive, but highlighting the
potential impact of collateral estoppel "which can have the same impact as a
compulsory counterclaim rule").
218. It is not clear whether the preclusion doctrines are a sufficient substi-
tute for compulsory joinder provisions in promoting the resolution of entire
controversies in one proceeding. The effectiveness of claim preclusion as a
compulsory joinder device turns both on how broadly the jurisdiction defines a
claim and on the extent claim preclusion can affect those who are in the litiga-
tion but choose to assert no claims. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying
text. Given the vagaries of issue preclusion doctrine, the likelihood that a par-
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this approach enhances litigant freedom only incrementally.
Further, it does so at a heavy price. Relying on the preclusion
doctrines increases the potential that litigants will be misled by
the permissive language of the joinder rules and thus will lose
claims inadvertently through preclusion.219
2. Ensuring Single Litigation of Entire Controversies
At the other end of the spectrum, a number of states go
further than the Federal Rules in requiring litigants to raise re-
lated claims. They insist on some or all of the following: claim-
ants must join all claims they have against an existing opponent
that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of the action;220 plaintiffs must raise all related
claims they have against any third-party defendant brought
into the litigation;22 ' certain impleader claims are compul-
ticular issue will be precluded in subsequent litigation is simply too uncertain
to substitute for a compulsory joinder rule. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 28-29 (1982) (discussing exceptions to issue preclusion).
219. This problem might be cured in part by alerting parties, in the text of
the Rules themselves, that preclusion doctrine is independent of the permis-
sive joinder rules, and thus the preclusion doctrine may affect a party who
fails to raise a related claim irrespective of the Rules. See, e.g., MISS. R. CIv. P.
13(a) (providing that "[i]n the event an otherwise compulsory counterclaim is
not asserted in reliance upon any exception stated in paragraph (a), relitiga-
tion of the claim nevertheless may be barred by the doctrines of res judicata
or collateral estoppel by judgment in the event certain issues are determined
adversely to the party electing not to assert the claim").
220. MICH. CT. R. 2.203(A)(1) (requiring a pleader stating a claim against
an opposing party to raise every transactionally related claim it has against
that party). The Rule does not require pleading of a claim, but merely re-
quires that if a claim is brought, all transactionally related claims against the
opponent must be included. 1 J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT
RULES ANNOTATED 479 (1962). It applies not only to the original claims of the
plaintiff against the defendant, but to any claims raised in the litigation. Ic at
476 (discussing application to counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
claims).
In effect, the compulsory joinder application of this rule simply mirrors
the effect of res judicata in a state that defines a claim in transactional terms.
See supra note 159. In fact, the Rule was thought to codify Michigan res judi-
cata practice in this regard. See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 203.1 committee notes
(1963). Its novelty is its presence as a pleading rule, rather than as a common
law requirement. The Michigan Rule also requires that an objection for fail-
ure to join a compulsory claim must be raised in the initial litigation or it is
waived, limiting the effect of the preclusion doctrines to the actual claim liti-
gated and the collateral estoppel consequences of the first action. MICH. CT. R.
2.203(A)(2); supra note 160.
221. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 14(a) & committee comments (providing that
plaintiff's failure to raise a related claim against a third-party defendant bars
the plaintiff from raising the claim in another action); MAINE R. Civ. P. 14(a)
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sory;222 cross-claims are compulsory;223 and finally, all litigants
must raise any claims they have related to the action.224
As more related claims are made compulsory, the effi-
ciency occasioned by litigating related claims at one time in-
creases. 22 In addition, the presence of an entire controversy
(same); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-332(c) (same); VT. R. Civ. P. 14(a) & reporter's notes
(same).
222. Under Louisiana law, failure to use impleader does not affect the right
of a party to bring an independent action against the possible third-party
defendant
unless the [third-party defendant] proves that he had means of defeat-
ing the action which were not used, because the defendant either
failed to bring him in as a third party defendant, or neglected to ap-
prise him that the suit had been brought.
LA. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. art. 1113.
223. In New Jersey, cross-claims that fall within the "entire controversy
doctrine" are compulsory. N.J. CIrv. PRAC. R. 4:7-5, 4:27-1(b).
224. New Jersey recognizes a practice, known as the "entire controversy
doctrine," which, with few exceptions, requires litigants to raise all claims they
have against each other arising from the same controversy. See N.J. Civ.
PRAC. R. 4:27-1(b). See generally Comment, The Entire Controversy Doctrine:
A Novel Approach to Judicial hfficiency, 12 SErON HALL L. REV. 260, 268-75,
279-86 (1982) (describing the entire controversy doctrine and its limitations
and exceptions). Although initially a doctrine of compulsory claim joinder, it
recently has been expanded to require compulsory party joinder as well. See
Cogdell v. Hospital Center, 116 N.J. 7, 22-28, 560 A.2d 1169, 1178-79 (1989). If
entire controversies truly are to be resolved in one proceeding, expanded com-
pulsory joinder of parties in all probability also would be necessary. See Mc-
Coid, supra note 152, at 724-28; see also Freer, supra note 149, at 837, 841-51
(proposing a broader joinder rule for mandatory party joinder).
Although rarely adopted, the notion that at least transactionally related
claims should be compulsory, if not all claims between parties, is not new. See,
e.g., Blume, A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defenses,
and for the Use of Counterclaims, 26 MICH. L. REv. 1, 57-61 (1927); cf. C.
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 144-46 (2d ed. 1947) (advo-
cating compulsory joinder); Blume, Required Joinder of Claims, 45 MICH. L.
REV. 797, 811-12 (1947) (surveying the common situations in which joinder of
claims is or may be required); Schopflocher, What Is a Single Cause of Action
for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 OR. L. REv. 319, 363-64
(1942); Note, Joinder of Actions, 40 KY. L.J. 105, 112-13 (1951) (discussing revi-
sion of the Kentucky Civil Code to provide for compulsory joinder of claims).
225. The frustration underlying the push toward increased reliance on
compulsory joinder of claim rules is well illustrated by Judge Pressler's opin-
ion in Win. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 150 N.J. Super. 277, 375 A.2d
675 (App. Div.), certif. den., 75 N.J. 528, 384 A.2d 507 (1977). In that case, a
complex multi-claim construction dispute, the court held, in part, that under
New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, two co-defendants who failed to
timely assert their claims against each other arising out of the basic contro-
versy had waived those claims. In setting the stage for this conclusion the
court remarked:
It is now almost seven years since this litigation was commenced, and
although it has grown in complexity, it is today no nearer trial than it
was on the day the first complaint was filed. The complex procedural
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before the court may enhance the prospects for settlement. On
the other hand, this push for efficiency through complusory
joinder compromises the other values associated with the claim
joinder rules.22 6 It also increases the possibility that parties
will forfeit claims by failing to raise them.
3. Protecting the Plaintiff's Proprietary Interest in the
Litigation
Under the Federal Rules, the plaintiff's claim may cease to
be the central focus of the litigation because of the litigation of
claims between other parties. To fully protect the plaintiff's in-
terest, one might disallow all claims between other parties.
The inefficiency this approach would engender, however, leaves
little to commend it. A more limited avenue, followed in a
number of states, is to limit the litigation of claims not involv-
ing the plaintiff2 2 7 to those related to the lawsuit. This allows
for the efficiency of litigating related claims at one time, while
history of this action and its failure throughout the tortuous course of
that history to have reached an adjudication of a single issue on the
merits might well serve as a primer demonstrating the endlessly pro-
tracted, inordinately wasteful and continuously fragmented judicial
process which the explicit procedural reforms of the Judicial Article
of the 1947 State Constitution were specifically designed to prevent.
Sisyphus, condemned to eternally pushing his rock up the side of the
mountain without ever reaching the top, may have been an appropri-
ate metaphorical analogy to the civil justice system of earlier times
when multiplicity of actions prevailed and form routinely triumphed
over substance. The currency of that analogy here signifies the con-
tinued frustration of the goal of affording expeditious substantial jus-
tice to litigants on the merits of their controversy and requires
reconsideration and restatement of basic principles governing the
management of inherently complex litigation.
Id- at 283-84, 375 A.2d at 678-79 (footnote omitted).
226. These other concerns are preserving the plaintiff's proprietary inter-
est and litigant control. See supra Parts II. A., III. C.; cf Freer, supra note
149, at 814 (highlighting the costs associated with forcing the litigation of
claims through broader compulsory joinder of claims). In addition, it has been
argued that to the extent compulsory joinder rules supplant the common law
workings of res judicata, the flexibility necessary to respond to the equities of
individual cases may be lost. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 148, § 4407 at 51-52. It is not clear, however, that a system of proce-
dural rules supplanting res judicata with compulsory joinder requirements in-
evitably would lack the necessary flexibility. For example, Alaska rules
specifically provide that "[t]hese rules are designed to facilitate business and
advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any
case where it shall be manifest to the court that a strict adherence to them
will work injustice." ALASKA R. Cwy. P. 94.
227. Although rare, a number of states limit the claims that can be raised
even when the plaintiff is involved directly. See, e.g., CONN. R. CT. § 116 (lim-
iting counterclaims to those that arise out of the transaction that is the subject
1990]
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also assuring that the claims raised in the litigation do not stray
too far from the action envisioned by the original plaintiff.2 28
The costs of this choice primarily are ones of efficiency.
The costs saved by having one lawsuit instead of two still may
be incurred if some claims cannot be raised because they are
not sufficiently related to the proceeding. In addition, if an-
other suit will be required in any event, a party may decide to
hold back its related claims as well as unrelated claims in the
first action, in order to proceed in a forum of choice.
It is possible that these potential costs are overstated. To
the extent a second suit is necessary to litigate an unrelated
claim, the additional cost incurred in having two suits instead of
one probably will not be that high. To be sure, costs will be ad-
ded by the fixed costs inherent in adding an independent case
to the courts' docket. Beyond that, however, little efficiency is
likely to be lost from barring litigation of this claim with an un-
related one, and some efficiency might be gained from avoiding
the confusion litigation of an unrelated claim could add to the
initial proceeding.
To the extent the necessity of a second suit influences a
party to hold back a related claim in the first suit that it other-
wise would raise there, the efficiency of resolving an entire con-
troversy at one time is lost. It is uncertain, however, how often
this would occur. In many instances the party itself will profit
from the litigation of the whole controversy at one time and
of the plaintiff's complaint); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-813 (1985) (requiring that
counterclaims must be related to the action).
228. For example, in Virginia, joinder of tort claims with contract claims is
limited to claims that "arise out of the same transaction or occurrence," VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-272 (1984), so unrelated claims cannot be brought even
though qualifying cross-claims and third-party claims are raised. Id- revisors'
note. Similarly, several states, such as Rhode Island, Texas, and Utah, retain
permissive joinder of claim provisions, like Federal Rule 18(a) before its 1966
amendment, which on the federal level had been read to limit cross-claim and
third-party claim joinder to qualifying claims. See R.I. DIsT. CT. R. Civ. P. 18;
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 18(a); TEX. R. Crv. P. ANN. 51(a); UTAH CT. R. ANN.
18(a). But compare Navajo Freight Lines v. Baldonado, 90 N.M. 264, 266-67,
562 P.2d 497, 499-500 (1977) (reading New Mexico's permissive joinder of
claims provision, which mirrors Federal Rule 18(a) before its amendment, to
allow joinder of a claim for individual damages with an impleader claim) with
Hancock v. Berger, 77 N.M. 321, 325, 422 P.2d 359, 362 (1967) (suggesting that
upon timely objection the same New Mexico rule precludes joining a non-qual-
ifying claim with a proper impleader claim). In addition, several states have
joinder of claim provisions that have been read to prohibit joining qualifying
and non-qualifying claims in impleader actions. See, e.g.,Ketcham v. CON-
RAIL, 146 Ill. App. 3d 196, 200, 496 N.E.2d 1104, 1107-08 (1986); Frank v. Art's-
Way Mfg. Co., 262 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Iowa 1978).
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will raise the related claim irrespective of the second suit. If
the problem still seems significant, the provision limiting par-
ties to the assertion of related claims could make their asser-
tion compulsory.
4. Equal Ownership of the Forum - Unlimited Joinder
Under the Federal Rules, once a party has filed a qualify-
ing claim, when one is required, the party then is allowed un-
limited joinder of claims.229 If one believes the rhetoric that no
harm comes from pleading claims together, only trying them
together,230 then nothing stands in the way of unlimited join-
der. Rather than worry about qualifying claims, a system may
provide simply that any party may plead any claim against any
other party. Although no state has gone quite this far, several
have come close.231
I suspect the Federal Rules do not do so for several rea-
sons. First, the Rules need to set a standard that works auto-
matically most of the time without court intervention. The
Rules attempt to provide a rough guide for what claims usually
should be heard together. If free joinder would lead to many
motions for severance or separate trial, when more limited join-
der would not, limited joinder makes sense.
Second, if the law of inertia works in litigation as it does in
the physical world, whatever is pleaded is likely to stand, with
a person opposing joinder given the burden of getting the court
to exercise its discretion to sever the claims. We thus should
set our pleading rules at a level of joinder that will be optimal
in most cases. 2
Finally, if freedom to join any claim regardless of its rela-
tionship to the other claims in the action is extended to all
claimants, problems of a plaintiff becoming a bystander in-
crease when claims not involving the plaintiff proliferate.
229. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
231. For example, in Indiana, Illinois, and New York, only inpleader
claims are transactionally limited; counterclaims, cross-claims and claims be-
tween plaintiffs and third-party defendants are not. IND. R. OF TRIAL P. 13(a),
(b), (g), 14; ILL. CODE CIV. P. § 2-406(b) (impleader and related claims), 2-608
(cross-claims and counterclaims); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1007-09 (im-
pleader and related claims), § 3019(a) (counterclaim), § 3019(b) (cross-claim).
232. Cf Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure- Agenda for Reform, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1883, 1888 (1989) (arguing that Rule 14 should be amended to re-
quire severance of certain impleader claims because the Rule's current permis-




As highlighted by this survey of state practices regarding
multi-claim litigation, many states deviate substantially from
the federal model. Substantial variations exist among the state
approaches to multi-claim litigation as well. The different ap-
proaches adopted reflect different policy trade-offs. A compar-
ative study of the satisfaction with and efficacy of the states'
differing approaches as perceived by lawyers, clients, and courts
would provide invaluable background for the reassessment of
the multi-claim provisions of the Federal Rules.2 33
CONCLUSION
The current Federal Rules dealing with multi-claim litiga-
tion at best are misleading and at worst are misguided. At a
minimum, the Rules should be amended to cure their current
ambiguity.
More broadly, however, the time may be ripe to reassess
the policy compromises that underlie the Rules. Given the cur-
rent movement in the federal courts toward a more centralized
resolution of complex controversies, perhaps the current limita-
tions on claim joinder should be lifted, allowing free joinder of
all claims. In addition, the requirement that related claims
must be raised could be expanded, thus requiring all parties to
raise all claims involved in the basic controversy, and leaving
severance or separate trials as the method to protect the plain-
tiff's proprietary interest in the litigation. In assessing whether
such a change is advisable, future rule drafters should learn
from the experiences in the states. State approaches vary
widely, giving differing weights to the competing policies in-
volved. They provide a rich base of experience from which to
assess possible changes in the federal approach to multi-claim
litigation. Whether language reform or changing the policy mix
of the Rules ultimately is pursued, the goal must be to better
and more simply explain the rights and duties of parties in-
volved in multi-claim litigation. The current complexity of
multi-claim litigation in the federal courts makes this a most
urgent goal.
233. One possible approach is to survey those litigators who practice in
state court in New York and New Jersey and in federal court as well. New
York provides a model of a permissive joinder approach to multi-claim litiga-
tion, while New Jersey takes a compulsory joinder approach. See supra notes
215, 224, 231. The Federal Rules approach falls between the two. FED. R. Civ.
P. 13(a), (b), (g), 14.
[Vol. 74:507
